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Software watermarking is a software protection technique used to defend the intellectual
property of proprietary code. In particular, software watermarking aims at preventing
software piracy by embedding a signature, i.e. an identifier reliably representing the
owner, in the code. When an illegal copy is made, the owner can claim his/her identity
by extracting the signature. It is important to hide the signature in the program in order
to make it difficult for the attacker to detect, tamper or remove it. In this work we
present a formal framework for software watermarking, based on program semantics and
abstract interpretation, where attackers are modeled as abstract interpreters. In this
setting we can prove that the ability to identify signatures can be modeled as a
completeness property of the attackers in the abstract interpretation framework. Indeed,
hiding a signature in the code corresponds to embed it as a semantic property that can
be retrieved only by attackers that are complete for it. Any abstract interpreter that is
not complete for the property specifying the signature cannot detect, tamper or remove
it. We formalize in the proposed framework the major quality features of a software
watermarking technique: secrecy, resilience, transparence and accuracy. This provides an
unifying framework for interpreting both watermarking schemes and attacks, and it
allows us to formally compare the quality of different watermarking techniques. Indeed, a
large number of watermarking techniques exist in the literature and they are typically
evaluated with respect to their secrecy, resilience, transparence and accuracy to attacks.
Formally identifying the attacks for which a watermarking scheme is secret, resilient,
transparent or accurate can be a complex and error-prone task, since attacks and
watermarking schemes are typically defined in different settings and using different
languages (e.g. program transformation vs. program analysis), complicating the task of
comparing one against the others.
1. Introduction
A major issue in computer security is the protection of proprietary software against
attacks that aim at stealing, modifying or tampering with the code in order to obtain
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M. Dalla Preda and M. Pasqua 2
(economic) advantages over it. Frontier Economics and the Business Software Alliance
(BSA) estimated that the global value of software piracy in 2015 was around 24$ Billion,
Frontier Economics also estimated that the projection of this value for 2022 is 42$-
95$ Billion (Frontier-Economics 2016; BSA 2016). Software developers are interested in
protecting the intellectual property of their products against software piracy, namely to
prevent the illegal (unlicensed) use of their code.
A key challenge in defending code running on an untrusted host is that there is no
limit on the techniques that the host can use to extract sensitive data from the code
and to violate its intellectual property and integrity. Code obfuscation, whose aim is
to obstruct code comprehension, represents a preventive tool against software piracy:
attackers cannot steal or tamper what they do not understand (Collberg et al. 1998).
Once an attacker goes beyond this defense, software watermarking allows the owner of
the violated code to prove the ownership of the pirated copies (Davidson and Myhrvold
1996; Moskowitz and Cooperman 1996; Collberg and Thomborson 1999, 2002). Software
watermarking is a technique for embedding a signature, i.e. an identifier reliably rep-
resenting the owner, in a cover program. This allows software developers to prove their
ownership by extracting their signature from the pirated copies. In the last two decades
researchers have developed a variety of software watermarking techniques, e.g. (Collberg
and Thomborson 1999, 2002; Nagra et al. 2002; Dalla Preda et al. 2008), that can be
classified in three main categories according to their extraction process: static, dynamic
and abstract watermarking. Static watermarking inserts signatures in the cover program
either as data or code and then extracts them statically, namely without executing the
code (Collberg and Thomborson 1999). Conversely, dynamic watermarking inserts sig-
natures in the program execution state (i.e. in its semantics) and the extraction process
requires the execution of the program, often on a special enabling input (Collberg and
Thomborson 1999). Abstract watermarking, introduced in (Cousot and Cousot 2004), en-
codes the signature in such a way that it could be extracted only by a suitable abstract
execution of the program.
The efficiency of a watermarking scheme is typically evaluated according to the fol-
lowing features: credibility that measures how strongly it proves authorship, secrecy that
deals with the complexity degree of signatures extraction by attackers, transparency that
measures how difficult it is for an attacker to realize that a program is marked, accu-
racy that evaluates the observational equivalence of the marked and original program,
resilience that measures how difficult it is for an attacker to compromise the correct ex-
traction of the signature and data-rate that considers the amount of information that can
be encoded by the considered watermarking scheme. When researchers propose a new
watermarking technique they usually claim its efficiency in terms of the aforementioned
features by discussing how the peculiar signature embedding and extraction methods
are able to ensure good degrees of quality with respect to different attackers. However,
existing embedding and extraction algorithms often work on different objects (control
flow graph, variables, registers, etc) and attackers may use different program analysis
techniques to compromise the embedded signature. This makes it difficult to formally
compare the efficiency of different watermarking systems with respect to attacks and to
discuss limits and potentialities of the watermarking schemes in order to decide which
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one is better to use in a given scenario. A unifying framework for software watermarking
and attackers would help this evaluation.
These problems also derive from the lack of theoretical studies on software water-
marking. Software watermarking has been formally defined in (Barak et al. 2001) where
the authors show that the existence of indistinguishability obfuscators implies that soft-
ware watermarking cannot exist. Furthermore, the recent candidate construction of an
indistinguishability obfuscator (Garg et al. 2013) lowers the hope of building meaningful
watermarking scheme. Fortunately, this impossibility results rely on the fact that the
signed program computes the same function as the original program. Indeed, in (Barak
et al. 2001) the authors suggest that if we relax this last constraint, i.e. we require that
the watermarking process has only to preserve an “approximation” of the original pro-
gram’s functionality, then positive results might come. This naturally leads to reason
about software watermarking at semantic level, as we do in the present work.
A first attempt to provide a formal semantics-based definition of software watermarking
has been proposed in (Giacobazzi 2008). Here the author introduces the idea of viewing
static and dynamic watermarking schemes as particular instances of a general abstract
watermarking scheme. Intuitively, abstract watermarking is static because no execution
is needed for signature extraction, and dynamic because the signature is hidden in the
semantics of the code. The idea is to see static, dynamic and abstract watermarking
techniques as particular instances of a common watermarking scheme based on program
semantics and abstract interpretation. In this work we follow this intuition and we trans-
form the scheme proposed in (Giacobazzi 2008) in a formal and consistent definition of
a software watermarking system. The idea is to embed a signature s in a program by
encoding it as a semantic property M(s), to be inserted in the semantics of the cover
program. In this setting, the extraction process requires an analysis of the semantics of
the marked code that has to be at least as precise as M(s). Interestingly, this notion of
precision of the extraction corresponds to the notion of completeness of the analysis in
abstract interpretation. This means that in order to extract the signature it is necessary
to know how it is encoded. In this view the semantic property for which the analysis has
to be complete in order to extract the signature plays the role of an extraction key. The
signature is hidden to any observer/analyzer of program’s semantics that is incomplete
for M(s), namely to any observer/analyzer that does not know the “secret key”.
Based on these ideas we provide a formal semantics-based definition of a watermarking
system. Moreover, we provide a specification of the quality features of a watermarking
system in terms of semantic program properties. For example, it turns out that a water-
marking scheme is transparent w.r.t. an observer when the embedding process preserves
the program properties in which the observer is interested. Moreover, the resilience of
a watermarking scheme to collusive attacks, which attempt to remove the signature
by comparing different marked programs, can be modeled as a property of abstract
non-interference (Giacobazzi and Mastroeni 2004) among programs. Finally, we do a
wider and more precise validation rather the one done in (Giacobazzi 2008) (which is
just sketched). We take into account five known watermarking techniques and we define
them in our framework, with a comparison of their quality features. Our investigation
and study in this direction has led to the following contributions.
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— Specification of a formal framework based on program semantics and abstract inter-
pretation for modeling software watermarking. The framework refines and extends
the one proposed in (Giacobazzi 2008).
— Formalization of the quality features (resilience, secrecy, transparence, accuracy) used
to measure the quality of a watermarking system in the framework.
— Validation of the framework on five watermarking techniques, together with a quali-
tative comparison of their features.
The results presented in this work are a revised and extended version of (Dalla Preda
and Pasqua 2016).
2. Preliminaries
In this section we present the background knowledge needed to read the rest of the
paper. We start by recalling some standard mathematical notations (Section 2.1) and
then the basic principles of abstract interpretation (Section 2.2). Next, in Section 2.3
we present the toy imperative programming language that we will use. We first present
the syntax (Section 2.3.1) and the semantics (Section 2.3.2) of the toy language. In
particular, in Section 2.3.2 we define the semantics for expressions and actions and the
auxiliary functions, namely all the basic parts needed for the definition of the transitional
semantics. From this latter we define the trace semantics of programs, since we need
the full history of programs executions in order to model the watermarking techniques.
Then we define the (traces) abstract semantics (Section 2.3.3) of programs written in
the proposed toy language since we need abstract interpreters for modeling attackers
and signature embedding. In Section 2.4 we introduce the notion of non-interference
among programs, namely an high-order notion of non-interference since standard non-
interference is defined among the variables of a program. We need this high-order notion
of non-interference when modeling certain quality features of the watermarking scheme
(as secrecy).
2.1. Mathematical notation
In the following, the symbol
/
= stands for “is defined as”. Given two sets S and T , we
denote with ℘(S) the powerset of S, with S \T the set-difference between S and T , with
S ⊂ T strict inclusion and with S ⊆ T inclusion. Let S⊥ be set S augmented with the
undefined value ⊥, i.e. S⊥
/
= S ∪ {⊥}. 〈P,≤〉 denotes a poset P with ordering relation
≤, while a complete lattice P , with ordering ≤, least upper bound (lub) ∨, greatest
lower bound (glb) ∧, greatest element (top) >, and least element (bottom) ⊥ is denoted
by 〈P,≤,∨,∧,>,⊥〉. Given functions f ∈ S −→ T and g ∈ T −→ R, their composition
g ◦ f ∈ S −→ R is g ◦ f
/
= λx . g(f(x)). We denote with v the pointwise ordering between
functions (on pesets). Given f ∈ P c−→ Q on posets, f is (Scott)-continuous when it
preserves lub of countable chains in P (we use the superscript c to denote a continuous
function). Given f ∈ P m−→ Q on posets, f is monotone if for any p, p′ ∈ P we have
that p ≤P p′ implies f(p) ≤Q f(p′) (we use the superscript m to denote a monotone
function). Given f ∈ C −→ D on complete lattices, f is additive [co-additive] when,
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for any Y ⊆ C, f(∨CY ) = ∨Df(Y ) [f(∧CY ) = ∧Df(Y )]. The right [left] adjoint of a








{y | x ≤ f(y)}].
2.2. Abstract Interpretation
Abstract interpretation is based on the idea that the behavior of a program at different
levels of abstraction is an approximation of its (concrete) semantics (Cousot and Cousot
1977, 1979). The concrete program semantics is computed on the concrete domain 〈C,≤C
〉, while approximation is given by an abstract domain 〈A,≤A〉. In abstract interpretation
the abstraction is specified as a Galois connection, GC in short, (C,α, γ,A), namely as
an abstraction map α ∈ C −→ A and a concretization map γ ∈ A −→ C that are monotone
and that form an adjunction: ∀y ∈ A, x ∈ C .α(x) ≤A y ⇒ x ≤C γ(y) (Cousot and
Cousot 1977, 1979). α [resp. γ] is the left[right]-adjoint of γ [α] and it is additive [co-
additive]. Abstract domains can be equivalently formalized as upper closure operators
on the concrete domain (Cousot and Cousot 1979). The two approaches are equivalent,
modulo isomorphic representations of the domain objects. An upper closure operator, or
closure, on poset 〈C,≤〉 is an operator ϕ ∈ C −→ C that is monotone, idempotent and
extensive (i.e. ∀c ∈ C . c ≤ ϕ(c)). Closures are uniquely determined by the set of their
fixpoints ϕ(C). The set of all closure on C is denoted by uco(C). The lattice of abstract
domains of C is therefore isomorphic to uco(C) (Cousot and Cousot 1977, 1979). If C is a
complete lattice, then 〈uco(C),v,t,u, λx .>, id〉 is a complete lattice, where id
/
= λx . x
and for every ρ, η ∈ uco(C), ρ v η iff ∀y ∈ C . ρ(y) ≤ η(y) iff η(C) ⊆ ρ(C). The glb u
is isomorphic to the so called reduced product, i.e.
d
i∈I ρi is the most abstract common
concretization of all ρi. Given X ⊆ C, the least abstract domain containing X is the least




S | S ⊆ X}.
Note that
d
i∈I ρi = M(
⋃
i∈I ρi). If (C,α, γ,A) is a GC then ϕ = γ ◦ α is the closure
associated with A, such that ϕ(C) is a complete lattice isomorphic to A.
Precision of an abstract interpretation is typically defined in terms of completeness.
Depending on where we compare the concrete and the abstract computations we obtain
two different notions of completeness (Giacobazzi et al. 2000; Giacobazzi and Quintarelli
2001). If we compare the results in the abstract domain, we obtain what is called backward
completeness (B-completeness) while, if we compare the results in the concrete domain,
we obtain the so called forward completeness (F-completeness). Formally, if f ∈ C −→ C
and ρ ∈ uco(C), then ρ is B-complete for f if ρ ◦ f = ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ, while it is F-complete for
f if f ◦ ρ = ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ. In a more general setting, if f ∈ C −→ C and ρ, η ∈ uco(C), then
〈ρ, η〉 is a pair of B[F ]-complete abstractions for f if ρ ◦ f = ρ ◦ f ◦ η [f ◦ η = ρ ◦ f ◦ η]
(equivalently, we say that f is B[F ]-complete for 〈ρ, η〉). A complete over-approximation
means that no false alarms are returned by the analysis, i.e. in B-completeness the
approximate semantics computed by manipulating abstract objects corresponds precisely
to the abstraction of the concrete semantics, while in F-completeness concrete semantics
does not lose precision computing on abstract objects.
The least fixpoint (lfp) of an operator F on a poset 〈P,≤〉, when it exists, is denoted
by lfp≤F , or by lfpF when ≤ is clear. Any continuous operator F ∈ C −→ C on a
complete lattice 〈C,≤,∨,∧,>,⊥〉 admits a lfp: lfp≤⊥F =
∨
n∈N F
i(⊥), where for any
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i ∈ N and x ∈ C: F 0(x) = x and F i+1(x) = F (F i(x)). Given an abstract domain
〈A,≤A〉 of 〈C,≤C〉, F ] ∈ A −→ A is a correct (sound) approximation of F ∈ C −→ C
when α(lfp≤CF ) ≤A lfp≤AF ].
Inducing forward completeness. The problem of minimally modifying the abstract do-
mains in order to gain completeness w.r.t. a given function has been solved in (Giacobazzi
et al. 2000; Giacobazzi and Quintarelli 2001). While in (Giacobazzi and Mastroeni 2008)
the authors addressed the dual problem, i.e. they show how to minimally modify a func-
tion in order to gain completeness w.r.t. the given abstract domains. So it is always
possible to minimally transform a given semantic function f in order to satisfy complete-
ness. Minimally means to find the closest function, by reducing or increasing the images
of f , w.r.t. a given property we want to hold for f (in this context, completeness). Here
we take into account only the case of increasing a given function, so we move upwards.
According to (Giacobazzi and Mastroeni 2008) given a monotone function f ∈ C m−→ C
and a pair of closures η, ρ ∈ uco(C) we can define
Fη,ρ
/
= λf . λx .
{
ρ ◦ f(x) if x ∈ η(C)
f(x) otherwise
We have that Fη,ρ(f) =
d
{h ∈ C −→ C | f v h ∧ h ◦ η = ρ ◦ h ◦ η}, namely Fη,ρ(f) is
the smaller function greater than f that is F-complete for 〈ρ, η〉. Unfortunately, Fη,ρ(f)
may lack monotonicity. But any function can be transformed to the closest monotone
function by considering the following basic transformer: M
/
= λf . λx .
∨
C{f(y) | y ≤C x}
(Giacobazzi and Mastroeni 2008). So we can define the forward completeness transformer
as Fη,ρ
/
= M ◦ Fη,ρ, such that Fη,ρ(f) =
d
{h ∈ C m−→ C | f v h ∧ h ◦ η = ρ ◦ h ◦ η}.
2.3. Programming language and semantics
In this section we introduce a simple imperative programming language, which is used
in the rest of the work. It is a simple extension of the one introduced in (Cousot and
Cousot 2002). The main difference is the ability of programs to interact with the user,
namely programs can receive input values.
2.3.1. Syntax. The syntax of our toy programming language is given by the following
grammar:
E ::= n | X | E + E | E · E | E − E
B ::= b | E < E | E = E | B ∧B | B ∨B | ¬B
A ::= X := E | inputX | skip
C ::= L : A→ L′; | L : B → {Ltt, Lff}; | L : stop;
where the syntactic categories are described in Figure 1.
A program is defined as a set of commands, each one labeled with an unique identifier
(its label). A command L : A → L′; performs an action A and it passes the execution
to the command labeled with L′. A command L : B → {Ltt, Lff}; passes the execution
to the command at label Ltt if the guard B is evaluated to tt, and to the command at
label Lff otherwise. The command L : stop; stops the execution. Note that this latter
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n ∈ Int . integers
b ∈ Bool . booleans
X ∈ Var . program variables
L ∈ Lab . program labels
E ∈ Exp . arithmetic expressions
B ∈ Bexp . boolean expressions
A ∈ Act . program actions
C ∈ Com . commands
P ∈ Imp
/
= ℘(Com) . programs
Fig. 1. Syntactic categories.
can be simulated by L : skip→ ⊥; and the command L : skip→ L′; can be simulated
by L : tt→ {L′,⊥}; where ⊥ is the undefined label. In the following, with a little abuse
of notation, we use ⊥ to refer to an undefined value of any type. The action X := E;
assigns the value of expression E to the variable X. The action inputX takes an input
from the user and assigns its value to the variable X. The action skip does not perform
any operation.
2.3.2. Semantics. An environment ρ ∈ Env maps each variable X ∈ dom(ρ) to its value
ρ(X) ∈ Z⊥. A context ζ ∈ Con is a pair binding an environment ρ ∈ Env to a standard
input ι ∈ Sin, i.e. ζ = 〈ρ, ι〉. The value domains used in the definition of the semantics
are reported in Figure 2.
n ∈ Z . integer numbers
b ∈ B
/
= {tt,ff} . truth values
ρ ∈ Env
/






n . standard inputs
ζ ∈ Con
/
= Env× Sin . contexts
ς ∈ Σ
/
= Com× Con . program states
Fig. 2. Value domains.
In order to present the semantics we need the following auxiliary functions.
— A function that returns the set of labels of a given command
labJL : A→ L′; K
/
= {L}
labJL : B → {Ltt, Lff}; K
/
= {L}






= {labJCK | C ∈ P} denotes the set of all labels of a program P .
— A function that returns the set of variables of a given expression, action or command.
varJDK
/
= {X ∈ Var | X is in D} where D ∈ {E,B}
varJX := EK
/
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varJCK denotes the set of all variables of P .
— A function that returns the set of actions of a given command.
actJL : A→ L′; K
/
= {A}
actJL : B → {Ltt, Lff}; K
/
= ∅
actJL : stop; K
/
= ∅
— A function that returns the set of successor labels of a given command.
sucJL : A→ L′; K
/
= {L′}
sucJL : B → {Ltt, Lff}; K
/
= {Ltt, Lff}
sucJL : stop; K
/
= {⊥}
— A function that returns the set of possible environments of a given set of variables.
envJX K
/





envJvarJP KK denotes the set of all possible environments of P .
— A function that returns the set of possible contexts of a given environment.
conJρK
/




= {conJρK | ρ ∈ envJP K} denotes the set of all possible contexts of P .
— Two functions top ∈ Sin −→ Z⊥ and next ∈ Sin −→ Sin that deal with standard
inputs. The function top, given a standard input, returns the next value that will be





⊥ if ι = ε
z ∈ Z if ι = zι′
The function next, given a standard input, returns another standard input without





ε if ι = ε
ι′ ∈ Sin if ι = zι′ ∧ z ∈ Z
Semantics of expressions and actions. In order to define the semantics of programs we
need to define the semantics of boolean/arithmetic expressions and the semantics of
actions.
Arithmetic expressions:













EJE1Kζ ∈ Z and EJE2Kζ ∈ Z
⊥ otherwise
Boolean expressions:













EJE1Kζ ∈ Z and EJE2Kζ ∈ Z
⊥ otherwise

























BJB1Kζ ∨ BJB2Kζ if BJB1Kζ ∈ B and BJB2Kζ ∈ B
⊥ otherwise
Actions:
AJAK ∈ Con −→ Con
AJX := EK〈ρ, ι〉
/





〈ρ[X ←[ top(ι)], next(ι)〉 if top(ι) 6= ⊥




Semantics of programs. A program state ς ∈ Σ is a pair ς = 〈C, ζ〉, where C is the
command to be executed and ζ is the current context of execution. The transition relation





〈C ′, ζ ′〉
∣∣∣ ζ ′ = AJactJCKKζ ∧ labJC ′K ∈ sucJCK}
The set of states of a program is defined as:
stsJP K
/
= P × conJP K. The transitional
semantics
SJP K ∈ stsJP K −→ ℘(stsJP K) of a program P is:
SJP K〈C, ζ〉
/
= {〈C ′, ζ ′〉 ∈ S(〈C, ζ〉) | ζ, ζ ′ ∈ conJP K ∧ C,C ′ ∈ P}
A trace σ ∈ Σ is a sequence of states σ0, . . . σn−1 of length |σ| = n > 0 such that for
all i ∈ [1, n) we have σi ∈ S(σi−1). With Σ+ we indicate the set of all finite traces. If σ
is a finite trace, we indicate with σ` its first element, i.e. σ` = σ0, and we indicate with
σa its last element, i.e. σa = σ|σ|−1.
The partial finite traces semantics LP M⊕ ⊆ Σ+ of a program P is the set of all finite
partial traces of P . This semantics can be computed as the least fixpoint of the so called
transition function F⊕P ∈ ℘(Σ+)







∣∣∣ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς) ∧ σς ∈ S}




P . If we are only interested in those executions of a program P starting
from a given set L ⊆ labJP K of entry points, so that I
/
= {〈C, ζ〉 | ζ ∈ conJP K ∧ C ∈
P ∧ labJCK ∈ L} is the set of initial states, we can consider the partial traces semantics
LP [I]M⊕ ⊆ Σ+ of P which is the set of partial traces σ ∈ Σ+ starting from an initial
state σ0 ∈ I. The partial traces semantics LP [I]M⊕ can be expressed in fixpoint form as
lfp⊆∅F
⊕
P [I] where F
⊕





= λS . I ∪
{
σςς ′
∣∣∣ σς ∈ S ∧ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς)}
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= λS . lfp⊆∅F
⊕
P [S] = λS . LP [S]M⊕
A state ς is blocking (or final), w.r.t. a program P , if
SJP K(ς) = ∅. So the set of blocking
states of the program P is TP
/
= {〈C, ζ〉 ∈ stsJP K | sucJCK 6⊆ labJP K}. A maximal finite
trace of a program P , is a trace σ ∈ Σ+ of length n where the last state σn−1 is blocking.
LP Mn is the set of all finite traces of length n of the program P . The maximal finite traces
semantics LP M+ of the program P is given by the union of all maximal finite traces of




n>0{σ ∈ LP Mn | σa ∈ TP }. This semantics can be





= λS . TP ∪
{
ςς ′σ
∣∣∣ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς) ∧ ς ′σ ∈ S}
Similarly, we can define a function, called maximal input semantics, LP M+∈ ℘(Σ) −→
℘(Σ+) defined as follow:
LP M+
/
= λS . {σ ∈ LP M+ | σ` ∈ S}
Unfortunately, it seems that this semantic function cannot be expressed in fixpoint form
in the lattice 〈℘(Σ+),⊆,∪,∩,Σ+,∅〉. A possible way for avoiding the problem is to
calculate the function as the combination of partial input and maximal traces semantics,
so as:
LP M+= λS . LP M⊕(S) ∩ LP M+
But a better solution would be the definition of a specific semantic domain in which we
are able to compute this function directly.
Prefix ordering. Let pref ∈ Σ+ −→ ℘(Σ+) be a function that returns the set of prefixes
of a given trace, so pref(σ)
/
= {σ′ ∈ Σ+ | ∃σ′′ ∈ Σ+ ∪ {ε} . σ = σ′σ′′}. We can define the
relation 6⊆ ℘(Σ+)× ℘(Σ+) which is a partial order between sets of traces:
X 6 Y ⇔ ∀σ ∈ X ∃σ
′ ∈ Y . σ ∈ pref(σ′)∧
(∀σ′ ∈ Y ∃σ ∈ X .σ ∈ pref(σ′)⇒ Y ⊆ X)












∣∣∣∣∣ ∀σ′ ∈ ⋃
X∈X
X .σ ∈ pref(σ′)⇒ σ = σ′
}
The bottom element is ∅ ∈ ℘(Σ+), i.e. ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) .∅ 6 X holds.
Proposition 2.1. 〈℘(Σ+),6,],∅〉 is a directed-complete partial order (DCPO).
Proof. See Appendix A, Page 43.
Finally, let us define the maximal input semantic in this new domain. As for partial traces
semantics, we can consider the maximal traces semantics LP [I]M+ ⊆ Σ+ of P , which is
the set of maximal traces σ ∈ Σ+ starting from an initial state σ` ∈ I. Recall that
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the maximal finite traces semantics LP M+ is equal to
⋃
n>0{σ ∈ LP Mn | σa ∈ TP }. This




n>0{σ ∈ LP Mn | σ` ∈
I ∧ σa ∈ TP }. In the follow we indicate with LP MnI the set {σ ∈ LP Mn | σ` ∈ I} and with











because for every n the traces in LP Mn̄I are not prefixes of any trace in LP M
n+1
I , due to the
fact that they are maximal (and so the lub returns the union of this two sets).
So the semantics can be expressed as lfp6∅F
+
P [I] of the Scott-continuous, and so mono-





= λS . LP M1I ]
{
σςς ′
∣∣∣ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς) ∧ σς ∈ S}





Proof. See Appendix A, Page 45.
2.3.3. Abstract semantics. If we are interested in the abstract semantics of a program,
computed on a specific abstract domain, we need to compute the semantics using the best
correct approximation of the transfer function on the abstract domain. So if a semantics
is computed in a concrete domain C, as fixpoint of the transfer function F , then we can
compute its abstract interpretation in an abstract domain ρ ∈ uco(C) as the fixpoint
of the function ρFρ. If the abstract domain is B-complete for F then we have that
lfp ρFρ = ρ(lfpF ) (Giacobazzi et al. 2000).
For example, let 〈℘(Σ+),⊆,∪,∩,Σ+,∅〉 be the concrete domain and LP M⊕ the seman-
tics computed as fixpoint of the transfer function F⊕P . Then the best correct approxima-
tion of P in ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) is:
LP Mρ⊕
/
= lfp⊆∅ ρ ◦ F⊕P ◦ ρ
Let 〈℘(Σ+),6,],∅〉 be the concrete domain and let LP [S]M+ be the semantics computed




= lfp6∅ ρ ◦ F+P [S] ◦ ρ
So we can define the abstract maximal input semantics of P in ρ as:
LP Mρ+
/
= λS . lfp6∅ ρ ◦ F+P [S] ◦ ρ
2.4. Abstract non-interference
In order to define some features of watermarking systems, as secrecy, we need to constrain
the information flows occurring in the marked program, so we need a form of semantic
interference. Abstract non-interference, ANI in short, (Giacobazzi and Mastroeni 2004)
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is a weakening of non-interference by abstract interpretation. Let η, ρ ∈ uco(℘(ZL⊥)) and
φ ∈ uco(℘(ZH⊥ )), where ZL⊥ and ZH⊥ are the domains of public (L) and private (H)
variables. Here η and ρ characterize the attacker, instead φ states what, of the private
data, can flow to the output observation, the so called declassification of φ (Mastroeni
2005). A program P satisfies ANI, and we write [η]P (φ ⇒ ρ), if ∀h1, h2 ∈ ZH⊥ and
∀l1, l2 ∈ ZL⊥:
η(l1) = η(l2) ∧ φ(h1) = φ(h2)⇒ ρ(LP MD(〈h1, l1〉)L) = ρ(LP MD(〈h2, l2〉)L)
Where with LP MD ∈ ℘(Σ) −→ ℘(Σ) we denote the (angelic) denotational semantics of the
program P (Cousot and Cousot 2002; Giacobazzi and Mastroeni 2002). This notion says
that, whenever the attacker is able to observe the input property η and the property ρ of
the output, then it can observe nothing more than the property φ of the private input.
In order to model non-interference in code transformations, such as software watermark-
ing, we consider an higher-order version of ANI, where the objects of observations are
programs instead of values. Hence, we have a part of a program (semantics) that can
change, and that is secret, and the environment which remains the same up to an observ-
able property: these are the new private and public inputs. The function that, in some
way, has to hide the change is now a program transformer, which takes the two parts of
the program and provides a program as result. The output observation is the best correct
approximation of the resulting program.
Here the semantics we take into account is the maximal finite trace semantics. Let P
be the set of cover programs, Q the set of secret programs and I ∈ Imp × Imp −→ Imp
an integration function. As usual, the attacker is modeled as a couple 〈η, ρ〉, with η, ρ ∈
uco(℘(Σ+)), that represents the input and output public observation power. Instead
φ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) is the property of the secret input.
Definition 2.1 (HOANI for maximal finite traces semantics). The integration pro-
gram I, given η, φ, ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), satisfies higher-order abstract non-interference (for
maximal finite traces semantics) w.r.t. 〈η, φ, ρ〉 and 〈P,Q〉 if:









+ ⇒ LI(P1, Q1)M
ρ





+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca to indicate that the program I satisfies higher-order abstract
non-interference (for maximal finite traces semantics) w.r.t. 〈η, φ, ρ〉.
Deriving attackers. In this section we introduce a method for defining attackers, via
abstract interpretation, for which a program is safe. In this case security refers to abstract
non-interference. In particular, it is interesting to characterize the most concrete (i.e.
the most precise) attacker for which a program is safe. In fact it can be shown that
if [η]P (φ ⇒ ρ) then, for any β such that ρ v β, it holds [η]P (φ ⇒ β) (Giacobazzi
and Mastroeni 2004). That is, if abstract non-interference holds observing in output
the property ρ, then it holds also observing in output any property more abstract than
ρ. In (Giacobazzi and Mastroeni 2004; Mastroeni 2005) it is shown how to derive the
most concrete attacker for which ANI holds. Following these results, we can analogously
derive the most concrete attacker for which HOANI holds. In this case sets of values are
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replaced by sets of traces. Attackers are defined as pairs of abstract domains, therefore
we characterize a domain transformer, parametric on the program to be analyzed, that
transforms each non-secret output abstraction into the nearest abstraction for which
HOANI holds. We fix a public input property η and a private input property φ, with
η, φ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)). We then consider an abstraction ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) such that HOANI
does not hold w.r.t. a program I ∈ Imp, i.e. H+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca does not hold. We can
derive the most concrete ρ̂ that is more abstract than ρ and such that
H
+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca
holds, which is called higher-order abstract secret kernel for I.








∣∣∣ ρ v β ∧ H+[η]I(φ⇒ β)bca}
is the higher-order abstract secret kernel trasformer for I.
To characterize this transformer we must characterize when a program property is safe.
Program properties are collections of traces so we have to characterize the sets of traces
that can belong to the kernel in order to satisfy HOANI. To this end, we define a predi-
cate on sets of traces identifying the elements that form the secret kernel. Clearly these
elements must ensure non-interference, namely they must abstract in the same element
all objects that should be indistinguishable. To achieve this we define two equivalence
relations that group programs according to a property on public programs (η) and a
property on private programs (φ). Let ≡η,≡φ⊆ Imp× Imp be such that:
≡η
/





= {〈Q,Q′〉 | Q,Q′ ∈ Q ∧ LQMφ+ = LQ′M
φ
+}
So we can define the set of indistinguishable elements for HOANI:
ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) = {LI(P
′, Q′)M+ | P ′ ≡η P ∧Q′ ≡φ Q}
These sets are collections of sets of traces that should be indistinguishable for each secure
abstraction, i.e. they should be approximated in the same object. Similarly, we can define
the predicate Secr for HOANI:
∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) . SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)⇔ ∀P ∈ P∀Q ∈ Q .
(∃Z ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) . Z ⊆ X ⇒ ∀W ∈ Υ
H+
I,η,(φ)(P,Q) .W ⊆ X)
So Secr(X) holds if X contains all the elements, i.e. all the sets of traces, that have to
be indistinguishable or non of them. Indeed, Secr identifies all and only the sets which
are in the secret kernel.





Proof. See Appendix A, Page 46.
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This means that the set of elements in ℘(Σ+) for which Secr holds corresponds to the
secret kernel of id, namely it coincides with the most concrete domain for which HOANI
holds. This abstraction is called most powerful harmless attacker for HOANI and it is
precisely the most precise attacker for which the program is safe. Furthermore we can
characterize the secret kernel of a generic domain ρ.





Proof. By definition KH+I,η,(φ) = λρ .K
H+
I,η,(φ)(id) t ρ, so we have to prove that this
domain is exactly {X ∈ ρ | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)}. This means that this latter has to be equal
to {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)} t ρ. Remember that two sets are the same if one is
included in the other and vice versa. Consider an element Y ∈ {X ∈ ρ | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)}.
Clearly for this element Y ∈ ρ and SecrH+I,η,(φ)(Y ) hold, i.e. Y belongs to K
H+
I,η,(φ)(id)tρ.
Similarly the inverse inclusion holds.
3. Semantics-based Software Watermarking
3.1. The framework
We follow the nomenclature introduced in (Cousot and Cousot 2004) for describing the
basic components of a watermarking technique for programs written in Imp and signa-
tures s ∈ S.
Stegomarker M ∈ S −→ Imp, a function that generates a program which is the encoding
of a given signature s ∈ S, i.e. it generates the stegomark M(s) ∈ Imp
Stegoembedder L ∈ Imp×Imp −→ Imp, a function that generates a program which is the
composition of a stegomark and a program, called stegoprogram L(P,M(s)) ∈ Imp.
Stegoextractor F ∈ Imp −→ S, a function that extracts the signature from a stegopro-
gram; for all s ∈ S it must be s = F(L(P,M(s))).
When L and M are clear from the context we denote the stegoprogram L(P,M(s)) as
Ps. The stegoextractor takes a stegoprogram, analyzes it either statically or dynamically,
and then it returns the signature encoded in the stegomark. It is well known (Cousot
and Cousot 1979) that static analysis can be modeled in the context of abstract interpre-
tation, where a property is extensionally represented as a closure operator representing
the abstract domain of data satisfying it. In particular, static analysis is performed as
an abstract execution of the program, namely as the (fixpoint) semantic computation
on the abstract domain. Instead, dynamic analysis can be modeled as an approximated
observation of a potentially abstract execution since it describes partial knowledge of the
execution (only on certain inputs). This means that, in all cases, the encoded signature
can be seen as a property of the stegomark’s semantics and therefore of the stegopro-
gram’s semantics. In this view a stegoextractor is an abstract interpreter that executes
the stegoprogram in the abstract domain β ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) that allows to observe the
hidden signature. In order to deal with dynamic watermarking we need to model the
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enabling input that allows to extract the signature. Since in our model the residual input
stream is part of the program state, the enabling input can be modeled as a state prop-
erty η ∈ uco(℘(Σ)). We consider a set P ⊆ Imp of cover programs that do not already
encode a signature† and we specify a watermarking system as a tuple 〈L,M, β〉.
Definition 3.1 (Software Watermarking System). Given L ∈ Imp×Imp −→ Imp, M ∈
S −→ Imp and β ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), the tuple 〈L,M, β〉 is a software watermarking system
for programs in P and signatures in S if M is injective and there exists η ∈ uco(℘(Σ))
such that ∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S:
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+= λX .
{
LM(s)Mβ+(X) if X ∈ η(℘(Σ+))
LP Mβ+(X) otherwise
X ∈ η(℘(Σ+))⇒ LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)M
β
+
This means that when computing the semantics in the abstract domain β, the stegopro-
gram L(P,M(s)) behaves like the stegomark M(s) on the enabling inputs, and like the
cover program P otherwise. Here LM(s)Mβ+ is precisely the information representing the
watermark at the semantic level, namely the property of the stegomark that hides (en-
codes) the signature. In this setting it is clearly possible to reduce the precise extraction
of the signature to a completeness problem. To this end we associate the stegomarker
M with its semantic counterpart M : S −→ uco(℘(Σ+)), which encodes a signature in a
semantic program property. In particular, given the watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 we
define M
/
= λs.{∅, LM(s)Mβ+,Σ+}, namely M takes a signature s and it returns the atomic
closure of LM(s)Mβ+. Indeed, M(s) provides a semantic representation of the signature s.
Observe that, by construction, we have that ∀s ∈ S . β v M(s) and this ensures that β
is precise enough for extracting the signature. Moreover, the abstract semantics of the
stegoprogram computed on β reveals the watermark information LM(s)Mβ+ ∈M(s) under
the enabling input X ∈ η(℘(Σ)) only if it is F-complete for η and M(s). This means that
the semantics of the programs built by the stegoembedder can be fully understandable by
the stegoextractor, namely this latter is able to extract the property representing the sig-
nature. Recalling the operator F inducing F-completeness introduced in Section 2, we can







for η and M(s).
Indeed, if LPsM
β
+ is F-complete then LPsM
β
+◦ η = M(s) ◦ LPsM
β
+◦ η holds. When η(℘(Σ))




+(X) and consequently that LPsM
β
+(X) ∈
M(s). This means that LPsM
β
+(X) is an element of M(s), more precisely it is exactly
LM(s)Mβ+ and it represents the signature s. If η(℘(Σ)) does not contain X, the system
should guarantee that the abstraction of the stegoprogram does not reveal the signature,




minimizes false positive. Note that, if the abstract semantics of the stegoprogram is
complete, it may well happen that the concrete semantics of the stegoprogram is not
† This is an assumption usually made by software watermarking techniques, i.e. before the insertion
the stegoembedder checks if the cover program is watermarkable.



















Fig. 3. F-incompleteness[-completeness] for the cover program[stegoprogram]
complete, i.e. LPsM+ is not F-complete for η and M(s) (see Figure 3). This means that
the knowledge of the stegomark may not be sufficient to extract the signature without
knowing the semantic property used to encode it.
The different kinds of software watermarking techniques can be seen as instances of
Definition 3.1.
— Static and abstract watermarking correspond to a watermarking system where η = id
and β is decidable (i.e. implementable with static analysis). This captures the fact
that the interpretation of the stegoprogram always reveals the stegomark, indepen-
dently from the input.
— Dynamic watermarking corresponds to a watermarking system where η 6= id and β is a
generic (concrete) interpreter. In this case, the concrete semantics of the stegoprogram
reveals the stegomark only when a particular input sequence is given.










+ and we can recognize that the stegoprogram has been
tampered.
3.2. Software watermarking features
Given a software watermarking technique it is desirable to know if it is better or worse
rather than other existing techniques, in some specific context of interest. In order to
perform such a comparison we need to define some “features” that allow us to measure
the efficacy of a watermarking system. For this reason, in the following, we describe
and formalize in the proposed framework the most significant features that a software
watermarking system should have. The features that we introduce are the ones that
can be formalized in terms of progam semantics and abstract interpretation. There are
features that cannot be formalized in this way as for example data-rate and credibility.
Data-rate deals with the amount of information that can be embedded by the considered
watermarking scheme and it strictly depends on the implementation of the stegomarker,
so it is not an intrinsic property of the watermarking system. Credibility measures how
strongly a watermarking scheme provides authorship and it typically requires statistical
evaluations.
In the rest of this section we refer to a watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉, to a set of cover
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programs P and to a set of signatures S. Moreover, we use β to denote the extraction
domain and M(s) to denote the domain that semantically encodes the signature s.
3.2.1. Resilience. Resilience concerns the capacity of a software watermarking system to
be immune to attacks. There are four major types of attacks (Collberg and Thomborson
1999).
Distortive attacks. The attacker modifies the stegoprogram in order to compromise the
stegomark, i.e. the attacker applies syntactic or semantic transformations in order to
make the signature no more recoverable by the stegoextractor.
Collusive attacks. The attacker compares different stegoprograms of the same cover
program in order to obtain information on the stegomark. Doing so it could, for
example, identify the location of the stegomark within the stegoprogram and then
remove it.
Subtractive attacks. The attacker tries to eliminate the stegomark from the stegopro-
gram so that it is no longer possible to extract the signature (usually this attack needs
a preliminary analysis for identifying the location of the stegomark).
Additive attacks. The attacker adds another stegomark to the stegoprogram so that
the previous stegomark is “overwritten” or so that the program contains more than
one stegomark. In the latter case it is not possible to establish which stegomark has
been inserted first and therefore the legitimate owner cannot be determined.
A software watermarking system is resilient w.r.t. a particular kind of attack when it
is immune to any attack of that type. We can classify attacks as conservative and not
conservative according to the effects that they have on program semantics. Conservative
attacks maintain the program denotational semantics (input/output) unmodified, while
non-conservative attacks do not ensure this.
Observe that subtractive attacks and collusive attacks are related to the localization
of the stegomark and hence the resilience to these attacks reduces to a secrecy problem
(as explained below). In fact, following (Collberg and Thomborson 1999), we consider
subtractive attacks to be those attacks that somehow locate the stegomark and then
remove it. On the other hand, those attacks that eliminate the signature by creating a
functionally equivalent unsigned program are considered to be distortive attacks in this
work (they can be seen as distortive attacks that preserve the denotational semantics).
Resilience to additive attacks is very difficult to obtain, in fact if an attacker adds another
signature (with another technique) it is impossible to prove which stegomark was inserted
first. For this reasons in the following we focus on the resilience to distortive attacks.
A distortive attack can be seen as a program transformer t ∈ Imp −→ Imp that modifies
programs preserving their denotational semantics, namely their input/output behavior.
Indeed, a distortive attack wants to modify the marked program as much as possible
(while preserving its functionality) in order to compromise the stegomark. So there are
program’s properties that the attack preserves and others that it does not preserve,
namely there are abstractions ψ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) such that ψ(LP M+) 6= ψ(Lt(P )M+). Ac-
cording to (Dalla Preda and Giacobazzi 2009) we denote with δt ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) the most
concrete property preserved by the transformation t on programs semantics, namely such
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that ∀P ∈ Imp . δt(LP M+) = δt(Lt(P )M+). This implies that every property ψ more ab-
stract than δt, i.e. δt v ψ, is preserved by t. Observe that when δt v
d
{M(s) | s ∈ S}
it means that the distortive attacker t preserves the semantic encoding of all signatures
and therefore the watermarking system is resilient w.r.t. t. When t preserves the semantic
encoding of a subset of possible signatures, those for which δt v M(s), we can identify
the class of stegoprograms that resist to t. In the worst case, when ∀s ∈ S . δt 6v M(s),
the software watermarking system is not able to contrast in any way the attacker t. This
leads to the definition of the following levels of resilience.
Definition 3.2 (t-resilience). A software watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 is:
— t-resilient when δt v
d
{M(s) | s ∈ S}
— t-vulnerable when ∃s ∈ S . δt 6vM(s)
— t-ineffective when ∀s ∈ S . δt 6vM(s)
Furthermore, if an attacker t is conservative it must preserve the denotational semantics,
DenSem ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), of the original program so we have that δt v DenSem. This domain
is obtained from maximal finite traces semantics as DenSem(X)
/
= {σ ∈ Σ+ | ∃σ′ ∈
X .σ` = σ
′
` ∧ σa = σ′a}. In this context every property more abstract than DenSem is
preserved.




∣∣ s ∈ S}
Basically, we say that a watermarking system is resilient when it is t-resilient to all those
distortive attackers t that preserve DenSem. A software watermarking system that exhibits
such behavior has not been yet found and it is an open research topic to demonstrate its
existence or not‡. If the attacker is not conservative, so it is willing to lose some original
program functionalities in order to nullify the stegomark, then δt 6v DenSem. In this case
we have a stronger notion of attackers and it is not possible to assert the resilience of a
software watermarking system to distortive not conservative attacks.
This formalization of resilience allows us to compare two watermarking systems w.r.t.
resilience. Given two watermarking systems A1 = 〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉, if
it holds that
d
{M1(s) | s ∈ S} v
d
{M2(s) | s ∈ S} then we have the following inclusion
{t | δt v {M1(s) | s ∈ S}} ⊆ {t | δt v {M2(s) | s ∈ S}}. Therefore A2 is, in general,
more resilient than A1. In Section 4 we show what we can do when M1 and M2 are not
comparable.
3.2.2. Secrecy. Secrecy concerns the difficulty of recovering the stegomark embedded in a
stegoprogram. Ideally a watermarking system is secret when it is impossible to extract the
signature from a stegoprogram without knowing the stegoextractor. In practice, secrecy
can be seen as the ability of the watermarking system to make indistinguishable to
an attacker the set of signatures embedded in a program. This clearly relates to the
‡ The results in (Barak et al. 2001) and recently in (Garg et al. 2013) about impossibility of water-
marking seem to lead to a negative answer.
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resilience to collusive attacks, which requires that an attacker is not able to distinguish
between stegoprograms that embed different signatures in the same cover program. This
notion can be formalized in terms of higher-order abstract non-interference, introduced in
Subsection 2.4. The private input is the set of possible stegomarks Q = {M(s) | s ∈ S},
while the public input is the set of cover programs P = P. Let φ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) be a
property that represents some stegomarks, and indeed some signatures. We assume that
the attacker does not have access to cover programs, so the abstraction of the public
input is id.
Definition 3.4 (φ-secrecy). A software watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 is φ-secret w.r.t.
an attacker ρ if
H










This means that if we mark a cover program with two different signatures that are
equivalent modulo φ, then the attacker ρ does not distinguish between the two generated
stegoprograms. Thus, any signature with the same property φ can be used for generating
stegoprograms resilient to collusive attacks made by the attacker ρ. We say that a system
is secret when it is >-secret, meaning that the set of indistinguishable signatures is S.
Given a property φ specifying a set of signatures, we can characterize the most concrete
observer ρ̂ for which
H
+[id]L(φ⇒ ρ̂)bca holds, called most powerful φ-secret attacker. It can
be characterized in terms of the secret kernel of higher-order abstract non-interference.
Indeed, it corresponds to the most concrete domain ρ̂ that is more abstract than id and
such that
H
+[id]L(> ⇒ ρ̂)bca holds, i.e. ρ̂ = K
H+
L,id,(φ)(id). The operator KL,id,(φ) and the
definition of the higher-order abstract non-interference can be found in Subsection 2.4.
For example, the most powerful >-secret attacker is KL,id,(>)(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈
P, X =
⋃
Q∈QLL(P,Q)M+} ∪ {Σ+} and it abstracts in the same object the traces of all
possible stegoprograms related to the same cover program. Of course, any attacker with
at least the same precision of the extractor β violates secrecy.
Thus, the secrecy level of a watermarking system is given by the most abstract property
φ and by the most concrete observer ρ̂ for which non-interference
H
+[id]L(φ⇒ ρ̂)bca holds.
The more φ is abstract and the more the system is secret. Vice versa, the more ρ̂ is
concrete and the more the system is secret. Observe that φ can range from id (all the
signatures are distinguishable) to > (no signature is distinguishable). When the most
powerful φ-secret attacker ρ̂ is equal to > then every attacker is able to distinguish the
signatures. Otherwise, the more ρ̂ is concrete and the more the system is secret.
This formalization of secrecy allows us to compare two watermarking systems w.r.t. se-
crecy. Given two software watermarking systems A1 = 〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉
we consider their most powerful φ-secret attackers ρ̂1 and ρ̂2. If ρ̂1 v ρ̂2 we have that
A1 is more secret than A2 w.r.t. φ. Indeed, a stronger attacker is necessary in order to
violate φ-secrecy for A1, rather than A2. In Section 4 we show what we can do when ρ̂1
and ρ̂2 are not comparable.
3.2.3. Transparence. Transparence concerns the ability to make it hard to realize that
a program is a stegoprogram, namely if it contains a signature. A watermarking system
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is transparent w.r.t. an observer if the latter is not able to distinguish a cover program
from every stegoprogram generated starting from it.
Definition 3.5 (Transparence). A software watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 is trans-
parent w.r.t. an attacker ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) if ∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S . LP Mρ+ = LL(P,M(s))M
ρ
+.
The greatest is the set of observers for which the system is transparent and the greatest
is the level of transparence of the watermarking system. So the characterization of the
most concrete observer ρ̃ for which the system is transparent is a good measure of the
transparence of the software watermarking system. This observer ρ̃ is called the most
powerful transparent attacker. This attacker can be characterized following the same
approach used for the most powerful >-secret attacker. In fact a system, in order to be
transparent w.r.t. an attacker has clearly to be >-secret w.r.t. that attacker. So, recalling
the set of indistinguishable elements for HOANI ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) introduced in Section 2.4,
we can define its counterpart for transparence, namely the set of all elements that have






∣∣ P ′ ≡id P ∧M(s′) ≡> M(s)} ∪ {LP M+}
These sets are collections of sets of traces that a secure abstraction should not distinguish,
i.e. that a secure abstraction should approximate in the same object. Then, we can
continue the construction of the secret kernel as done in Section 2.4. Clearly the analysis
is useful for any observer most concrete, or as concrete as, β. In fact the system cannot
be transparent for attackers that are at least as precise as the extractor.
Similarly to what we have done for secrecy, given two software watermarking systems
A1 = 〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉, we consider their most powerful transparent
attackers ρ̃1 and ρ̃2: if ρ̃1 v ρ̃2 we have that A1 is more transparent than A2. In Section 4
we show what we can do when ρ̃1 and ρ̃2 are not comparable.
3.2.4. Accuracy. A watermarking system is accurate if it preserves the functionality of
the cover program, i.e. the cover program and the stegoprogram have to exhibit the
same observable behavior. This concept can be defined as “behavior as experienced by
the user” (Collberg et al. 1997). This means that the stegoprogram can do something that
the cover program does not do, as long as these side-effects are not visible to the user.
Clearly this definition is very loose and it depends on what the user is able to observe of
program’s execution. We formalize this concept by requiring that the stegoprogram and
the original program have the same observable denotational semantics. This means that,
fixed what the user is able to observe, the stegoprogram and the cover program must
exhibit the same input/output behavior w.r.t. the fixed observation level.
Formally, we define an observational abstraction αO that characterizes what is inter-
esting to observe about the denotational semantics of programs. Then accuracy requires
that the cover program P and its stegoprogram Ps are indistinguishable w.r.t. αO, i.e.
αO(LP MD) = αO(LPsMD) (Cousot and Cousot 2002). Here LP MD denotes the (angelic)
denotational semantics defined in (Cousot 2002), which is an abstraction of the maximal
trace semantics. Indeed, LP MD is isomorphic to DenSem(LP M+). Then let 〈DO,≤O〉 be
a poset and αO ∈ ℘(Σ) −→ DO be a function such that (〈℘(Σ),⊆〉, αO, α+O, 〈DO,≤O〉)
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is a Galois connection. We say that two programs P,Q ∈ Imp are αO-observationally
equivalent iff αO(LP MD) = αO(LQMD).
Hence, a software watermarking system is accurate for an observational abstraction
αO, if for every program P ∈ P and for every signature s ∈ S it holds that P is αO-
observationally equivalent to Ps.
Definition 3.6 (Accuracy). Given a poset 〈DO,≤O〉 and an observational abstraction
αO ∈ ℘(Σ) −→ DO such that (〈℘(Σ),⊆〉, αO, α+O, 〈DO,≤O〉) is a GC, we have that a
watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 is accurate, w.r.t. αO, if for each program P ∈ P and for
each signature s ∈ S it holds that αO(LL(P,M(s))MD) = αO(LP MD).
Accuracy states that given an observational abstraction αO, every cover program P is
αO-observationally equivalent to any stegoprogram Ps embedding a signature s.
For example, a reasonable observational abstraction could be the output given to the
user. In the language Imp there is a command for catching the values inserted by the
user, but there are no commands for showing the results provided to the user. This can be
simulated by restricting a subset of program’s variables to store the values that are shown
to the user. We denote with Varout(P ) ⊆ varJP K this set of output variables. The user who
wants to observe the output of the program P has to check the values of the variables in
this set. Let us recall that the environment function ρ ∈ Env defines the binding between
variables and their current values. We denote with domout(ρ) ⊆ dom(ρ) the set of output
variables of environment ρ. The abstraction that catches the output given to the user
has to observe only the values of those variables, so αO
/
= αoutO ∈ ℘(Σ) −→ ℘(Env) can be





∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∃ς ∈ X .
ς = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉∧
dom(ρ′) = domout(ρ)∧
∀y ∈ domout(ρ) . ρ′(y) = ρ(y)

In this case, αoutO (LP MD) catches the input/output behavior of P , specified as a relation
between the inputs inserted by the user and the outputs provided to the user during the
execution of P . Clearly this approach is not applicable to programs that do not interact
with the user. In this case it is necessary to chose another type of observable abstraction,
more suitable for the context.
If we apply αoutO to Definition 3.6 we obtain that a software watermarking system is
accurate, w.r.t. αoutO , if:
∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S . αoutO (LP MD) = αoutO (LPsMD)
As regarding accuracy, this is a property that is not directly comparable among dif-
ferent watermarking techniques since it is defined w.r.t. the observational abstraction of
interest. However, the proposed formal framework provides the right setting for formally
proving the accuracy of a watermarking system w.r.t. an observational property.
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4. Validation
In order to validate our model we have formalized five known watermarking techniques
in our framework and we have compared them w.r.t. resilience, secrecy, transparence and
accuracy. In the following, we indicate with
d







{M(s) | s ∈ S} (See Subsection 2.2).
4.1. Watermarking Techniques
In order to cover a wide range of watermarking systems and to prove the generality of our
framework, we took in consideration an heterogeneous set of techniques. In the following,
we report a brief description of the considered watermarking techniques.
Block-reordering watermarking. Static technique, introduced in the patent (David-
son and Myhrvold 1996). The signature is a natural number and it is codified as a
permutation of the basic blocks of the cover program by modifying the program’s
Control Flow Graph (direct jumps are inserted to preserve program semantics). The
embedding ensures that the semantics of the cover program remains unmodified.
Static graph-based watermarking. Static technique, introduced in (Venkatesan et al.
2001). The signature is a natural number and it is codified as a graph which is added
to the CFG of the cover program while preserving its semantics. In particular, a
program whose CFG has the same shape of the graph generated starting from the
signature is derived and then added to cover program’s CFG. The embedding ensures
that the semantics of the cover program remains unmodified. The nodes of the graph
encoding the signature are marked before embedding in order to be identifiable at
extraction time.
Dynamic graph-based watermarking. Dynamic technique, introduced in (Collberg
and Thomborson 1999). The signature is a natural number and it is codified as a graph
allocated in the dynamic memory (in the heap) of the program, during a particular
execution. This execution is generated by a particular sequence of enabling input
values. Given a signature, a graph that encodes the signature and the code that
builds this graph are generated. The embedder adds the code that generates the
signature graph to the cover program in such a way that this code is executed only
with the enabling input. Furthermore, in order to facilitate the extraction process,
the code that builds the root of the signature graph is the last one to be executed, in
this way the root of the signature graph is the last node inserted in the heap.
Path-based watermarking. Dynamic technique, introduced in (Collberg et al. 2004).
The signature is a natural number and it is codified as a sequence of choices (true/false)
made at conditional statements during a particular execution of the program. This
execution is generated by a particular sequence of enabling input values. The em-
bedder takes the program code and it adds bogus branches in order to generate the
desired true/false sequence when executed on the enabling input.
Abstract constant propagation watermarking. This is the only known abstract wa-
termarking technique and it was introduced in (Cousot and Cousot 2004). The signa-
ture is a natural number and it is inserted into a particular variable w which, although
Semantics-based Software Watermarking by Abstract Interpretation 23
being modified during program execution, remains constant modulo an integer n. This
means that w is constant only in the domain of congruences modulo n, while other
domains consider w to have stochastic behavior. Thus, only the abstract interpreta-
tion of the program on a domain which is able to represent precisely congruences
modulo n can extract the signature. In order to embed arbitrarily long signatures the
technique refers to the Chinese remainder theorem. The insertion of the signature
does not alter the semantics of the cover program.
We provide the formalization for static, dynamic and abstract watermarking techniques.
Doing so we want to emphasize our main claim, i.e. that static and dynamic watermarking
are instances of abstract watermarking (for this latter the encoding in the framework is
intuitively more natural).
4.1.1. Static techniques. We present block-reordering watermarking and static graph-
based watermarking together because they are very similar. In the following, we use the
apex br to refer to block-reordering watermarking and the apex sgb to refer to static
graph-based watermarking.
In block-reordering watermarking the signature is codified as a permutation of the
basic blocks of the cover program’s CFG, where direct jumps are inserted to preserve the
cover program’s semantics. Instead, in static graph-based watermarking a program whose
CFG encodes the signature is added to the cover program in a way that the semantics
of this latter remains unmodified, as showed in Figure 4. The nodes of the added graph
are marked before the embedding.
Let graph ∈ N −→ G be a function that codifies a signature in a graph. Let cfg ∈ Σ+ −→
G be a function that, given a trace σ, returns the CFG of σ and let mark ∈ Σ+ −→ G
be a function that, given a trace σ, outputs the marked subgraph of the CFG of σ, for
a certain marking criterion (building the CFG and locating its marked nodes are both
task easily implementable analyzing a program trace).
The semantics LP Mβbr+ extracts the CFG of P , for block-reordering, and the semantics
LP Mβsgb+ extracts the marked subgraph of the CFG of P , for static graph-based. So the
extraction domains βbr and βsgb are:
βbr
/
= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | ∃g ∈ G . X = {σ ∈ Σ+ | cfg(σ) = g}} ∪ {∅,Σ+}
βsgb
/
= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | ∃g ∈ G . X = {σ ∈ Σ+ | mark(σ) = g}} ∪ {∅,Σ+}
In βbr there are all the sets of traces with the same CFG, instead, in βsgb there are
all the sets of traces whose CFG contains the same marked graph. We indicate with
Wbrs
/
= {σ ∈ Σ+ | graph(s) = cfg(σ)} the set of traces whose CFG codifies the signature
s, and with Wsgbs
/
= {σ ∈ Σ+ | graph(s) = mark(σ)} the set of traces whose CFG
contains the marked graph that codifies the signature s. Both are static techniques so η =
ηbr = ηsgb = id. Clearly, LM(s)Mβbr+ = Wbrs and so M(s)br = {∅,Wbrs ,Σ+}. Analogously,
LM(s)Mβsgb+ =Wsgbs and so M(s)sgb = {∅,W sgbs ,Σ+}.
Let G
/
= {⊥,G} ∪ {G}. The domains βbr, βsgb can be defined as βbr
/
= βbrγ ◦ βbrα,
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βsgb
/





⊥ if X = ∅






∅ if g = ⊥






⊥ if X = ∅






∅ if g = ⊥
{σ ∈ Σ+ | g = mark(σ)} if g ∈ G
Σ+ otherwise
Instead M(s)br and M(s)sgb can be defined as M(s)br
/
= M(s)brγ ◦M(s)brα and M(s)sgb
/
=










∅ if X = ∅






∅ if X = ∅
Wsgbs if X ⊆ Wsgbs
Σ+ otherwise
It is simple to see that for all signatures s we have M(s)br(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ βbr(℘(Σ+)) and
M(s)sgb(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ βsgb(℘(Σ+)), hence βbr v M(s)br and βsgb v M(s)sgb. The input
domain is id so there is not an enabling input or, equivalently, all the inputs reveal the
watermark.
Clearly, for every possible set of initial states, the CFG of the stegoprogram is the
same, i.e. it exists g ∈ G such that ∀σ ∈ LLbr(P,M(s)br)M+ we have that g = cfg(σ)
and it exists g′ ∈ G such that ∀σ ∈ LLsgb(P,M(s)sgb)M+ we have that g′ = cfg(σ).
Due to the techniques’ definitions, the graph g is equal to graph(s) and in g′ there is a
marked subgraph equal to graph(s). So we have that LLbr(P,M(s)br)Mβbr+ (X) =Wbrs and
LLsgb(P,M(s)sgb)Mβsgb+ (X) =Wsgbs , for every possible set of initial states.
Now, we can note that the CFG of M(s)br is graph(s), so LM(s)brMβbr+ (X) =Wbrs for ev-
ery possible set of initial states. Therefore, we have ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ) . LLbr(P,M(s)br)Mβbr+ (X) =
LM(s)brMβbr+ (X) = LM(s)
brMβbr+ . Analogously, the CFG of M(s)sgb is graph(s) and it is
marked by design, so LM(s)sgbMβsgb+ (X) = Wsgbs for every possible set of initial states.
Hence, for every set of initial states X, we have that both LLsgb(P,M(s)sgb)Mβsgb+ (X) and
LM(s)sgbMβsgb+ (X) are equal to Wsgbs , which represents the signature s.
So we can note that, as expected, for every signature s, LLbr(P,M(s)br)Mβbr+ is F-
complete for η and M(s)br and LLsgb(P,M(s)sgb)Mβsgb+ is F-complete for η and M(s)sgb.
Let us briefly discuss the features of these techniques.
Resilience. The systems are not resilient, because they are not fully immune to dis-
tortive attacks, i.e. DenSem 6v
d
{M(s)br | s ∈ S} and DenSem 6v
d
{M(s)sgb | s ∈ S}.






















(X) = Wbrs and




(Y ) = Wsgbs . But Wbrs ( DenSem(Wbrs ), because there is at least a trace with
the same initial and final state of a trace in Wbrs with cfg(σ) 6= graph(s). For example,
take a program equal to M(s)br in which we insert an opaque predicate.
Clearly its traces are in DenSem(Wbrs ) but they are not inWbrs , because this traces have
a different CFG. Analogously, Wsgbs ( DenSem(Wsgbs ), because there is at least a trace
with the same initial and final state of a trace in W sgbs with mark(σ) 6= graph(s). For
example, take a program equal to Lsgb(P,M(s)sgb) in which all the nodes of its CFG are
unmarked. Clearly its traces are in DenSem(Wsgbs ) but they are not inWsgbs , because these
traces do not have a marked subgraph.

















. Indeed, the systems are vulnerable to con-
trol flow obfuscation techniques (basically the ones which modify the CFG). For example,
a CFG flattening attack is able to damage the stegomark.
Secrecy. As regarding secrecy, the most powerful>-secret attackers for block-reordering
watermarking and static graph-based watermarking are:








They abstract in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms related to the
same cover program.
Accuracy. Finally, the systems are αoutO accurate, where α
out
O is an abstraction that ob-
serves only the output values showed to the user, since this property of the denotational
semantics is preserved. Clearly, for every program P and for every signature s it holds that









fact the reordering of nodes of the CFG for block-reordering does not affect the variables
of the cover program (there are new variables in the stegoprogram but, by design, these
do not interfere with the variables of the cover program) and the same holds for the em-
bedding algorithm of static graph-based, which guarantees that the added code does not
affect the variables of the cover program. So, with the same input, the cover program and
the stegoprogram give the same output, in both cases. Other features of these techniques
are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3.
4.1.2. Dynamic techniques. These techniques need a notion of enabling input, namely
a sequence I = I0 I1 . . . Ik of input values which “activates” the watermark. In our
framework we model the enabling input as a state property η ∈ uco(Σ). In a dynamic







∣∣∣∣ ς = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉 ∧ |ι| = |I|∧∀j ∈ [0, |I|) . top(next(ι)j) = Ij
}





Fig. 4. Static graph-based watermarking
The domain η can be defined as η
/










The first dynamic technique we present is dynamic graph-based watermarking. The
signature, a natural number, is encoded by a graph allocated in the dynamic memory (in
the heap), during a particular execution of the program. As said before, this execution
is generated by a particular sequence of input values I = I0 I1 . . . Ik called enabling
sequence. Given a signature, a graph that encodes the signature and the code that builds
this graph are generated. The embedder takes the program and it adds the code that
generates the graph in some locations of the cover program and this code is executed
only on the enabling input.
Let graph ∈ N −→ G be a function that codifies a signature in a graph, as the one
used for static techniques, and heap ∈ H −→ ℘(G) be a function that extracts the graphs
memorized in an heap. For the formalization of this technique in the framework, we have
to extend the information contained in the states of execution traces. We insert in the
state the heap of the program at the current execution step, i.e. Σ = 〈Com × Con × H〉.






|σ| = n+ 1 ∧ σn = 〈Cn, 〈ρn, ιn〉,Hn〉∧
top(ιn) = ε ∧ g ∈ heap(Hn) ∧ root(g) ∈ heap(Hn)∧
∀j ∈ [0, n) . root(g) /∈ heap(Hj) ∧ top(ιn) = ε

The semantics LP Mβ+ extracts the graph (with the root inserted at last) memorized in the
heap of the program P when all the input values are consumed, so the domain β is
β
/
= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | g ∈ G, X = G(g)} ∪ {∅,Σ+}
and it contains all the sets of traces which have the same graph (with the root in-
serted at last) memorized in the heap, when all the input values are consumed. With
Ws
/
= G(graph(s)) we indicate the set of traces for which, when all the input values are
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consumed, the heap contains the encoding of the signature s. Clearly, LM(s)Mβ+ = Ws
and so M(s) = {∅,Ws,Σ+}. Let again G
/
= {⊥,G}∪ {G}. The domain β can be defined
as β
/





⊥ if X = ∅
g ∈ G if ∀σ ∈ X .
|σ| = n+ 1 ∧ σn = 〈Cn, 〈ρn, ιn〉,Hn〉∧
g ∈ heap(Hn) ∧ root(g) ∈ heap(Hn)∧






∅ if g = ⊥
G(g) if g ∈ G
Σ+ otherwise
Instead M(s) can be defined as M(s)
/






∅ if X = ∅





It is simple to see that for any signature s we have M(s)(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ β(℘(Σ+)) and so
β v M(s). If X ∈ η(Σ) then X ⊆ Υ. All these sets X contain states that encode the
enabling input, so L(P,M(s)) executes the code which builds the graph graph(s) in the
heap. Indeed, we have that LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) =Ws for every possible set of initial states
contained in X. Now, the same reasoning can be done for M(s), because it codifies the
signature by design (starting from the sets of input states which encode the enabling
input). So LM(s)Mβ+(X) =Ws for every X ∈ η(Σ). If X /∈ η(Σ) then X 6⊆ Υ. All these X
do not contain states which encode the enabling input, so L(P,M(s)) does not execute
the code which builds graph(s) in the heap. So, when the set of initial states X encodes
the enabling input, we have that both LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) and LM(s)M
β
+(X) are equal to
Ws, which represents the signature s. We can note that, as expected, for every signature
s, we have that LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ is F-complete for η and M(s).
Let us briefly discuss the features of this technique.
Resilience. The system is not resilient, because it is not fully immune to distortive
attacks, i.e. DenSem 6v
d
{M(s) | s ∈ S}. In fact, suppose that DenSem v
d
M, so
∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) it holds that DenSem(X) ⊆
d
M(X). Let X = Ws, for a generic signature
s, so
d
M(X) = Ws. But Ws ( DenSem(Ws), because there is at least a trace with
the same initial and final state of a trace in Ws without graph(s) among the objects
memorized in the heap. For example, take a program equal to M(s) in which the code
that inserts the root node is duplicated.
Clearly, the traces of this program are in DenSem(Ws) but they are not inWs, because
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in this traces the last heap is not the only one containing the root of the graph. So
there is a X such that DenSem(X) 6⊆
d
M(X) and hence DenSem 6v
d
M. Indeed, the
system is vulnerable to attacks that modify the structure of the runtime objects created.
For example, a node-splitting attack is able to damage the stegomark (if it modifies the
structure of the root node of the graph then the extractor is not able to recognize the
stegomark).
Secrecy. As regarding secrecy, the most powerful >-secret attacker for dynamic graph-
based watermarking is KL,id,(>)(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈ P, X =
⋃
Q∈QLL(P,Q)M+} ∪
{Σ+} and it abstracts in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms related
to the same cover program.
Accuracy. Finally, the system is αoutO accurate. Indeed, the behavior of the cover pro-
gram is preserved w.r.t. this observation. Clearly, for every program P and for every
signature s it holds that αoutO (LP MD) = α
out
O (LPs)MD). In fact the embedding algorithm
guarantees that the inserted code does not affect the variables of the cover program. So,
with the same input, the cover program and the stegoprogram give the same output.
Other features of this technique are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3.
The second dynamic technique we present is path-based watermarking. Let again I =
I0 I1 . . . Ik be the enabling input, i.e. the sequence of input values which activates the
watermark. The embedder takes the program and it adds bogus branches in a way that
the sequence of choices at conditional statements during the execution on the enabling
input is equal to the binary encoding of the signature (see Figure 5).
Let bin ∈ N −→ {0, 1}? be a function that returns the binary encoding of a natural
number and branch ∈ Σ+ −→ {0, 1}? be a function that extracts the sequence of choices
at conditional statements in a trace. For example, we could encode a 1 whenever the
guard of an instruction is evaluated to tt, and a 0 whenever the guard is evaluated to ff.






∣∣∣∣ |σ| = n+ 1 ∧ branch(σ) = bin(k)∧σn = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉 ∧ top(ι) = ε
}
The semantics LP Mβ+ has to extract the sequence of choices at conditional statements for
the program P , so the domain β is β
/
= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | k ∈ N∧X = N (k)}∪{∅,Σ+} and
it contains all the sets of traces which have done the same choices, when all the input
values are consumed. With Ws
/
= N (s) we indicate the set of traces for which, when all
the input values are consumed, the sequence of choices at conditional statements codify
the signature s.
Clearly LM(s)Mβ+ =Ws and so M(s) = {∅,Ws,Σ+}. Let N
/
= {⊥,N}∪N. The domain
M(s) can be defined as M(s)
/






∅ if X = ∅
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Instead β can be defined as β
/





⊥ if X = ∅
k ∈ N if ∀σ ∈ X :
|σ| = n+ 1∧








∅ if k = ⊥
N (k) if k ∈ N
Σ+ otherwise
It is simple to see that for all signatures s we have M(s)(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ β(℘(Σ+)) and
so β v M(s). If X ∈ η(℘(Σ)) then X ⊆ Υ, therefore the choices at conditional
statements made by L(P,M(s)) starting from states in X are equal to bin(s), i.e.
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = Ws. The same reasoning can be done for M(s), because it cod-
ifies the signature by design (starting from the sets of input states which encode the
enabling input) and therefore LM(s)Mβ+(X) = Ws for every X ∈ η(℘(Σ)). If X /∈ η(Σ)
then X 6⊆ Υ. All these X do not contain states which encode the enabling input, so the
choices at conditional statements made by L(P,M(s)) starting from states in X are not
equal to bin(s). Hence, when the set of initial states X encodes the enabling input, we
have that both LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) and LM(s)M
β
+(X) are equal to Ws, which represents
the signature s. So we can note that, as expected, for every signature s, LL(P,M(s))Mβ+
is F-complete for η and M(s).
Let us briefly discuss the features of this technique.
Resilience. The system is not resilient since it is not immune to distortive attacks
that preserve the denotational semantics, i.e. DenSem 6v
d
{M(s) | s ∈ S}. In fact, sup-
pose that DenSem v
d
M, so ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) it holds that DenSem(X) ⊆
d
M(X). Let
X = Ws, for a generic signature s, so
d
M(X) = Ws. But Ws ( DenSem(Ws), because
there is at least a trace with the same initial and final state of a trace in Ws with
branch(σ) 6= bin(s). For example, take a program equal to M(s) in which we insert an
opaque predicate. Clearly its traces are in DenSem(Ws) but they are not in Ws, because
this traces have a different number of conditional statements. So there is a X such that
DenSem(X) 6⊆
d
M(X) and hence DenSem 6v
d
M. Indeed, the system is vulnerable to
control flow obfuscation techniques. For example, both edge-flipping and opaque predi-
cate insertion attacks are able to damage the stegomark.
Secrecy. As regarding secrecy, the most powerful >-secret attacker for path-based wa-
termarking is KL,id,(>)(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈ P, X =
⋃
s∈SLL(P,M(s))M+} ∪ {Σ+}. It
abstracts in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms related to the same
cover program.
Accuracy. Finally, the system is αoutO accurate, where α
out
O is an abstraction that ob-
serves only the output values showed to the user, since this property of denotational
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Watermark: 11001
Enabling input: 3
int main(int argc) {




int main(int argc) {
int a = 1, b = 0;
if (argc == 3) {
if (b == 0) a = 0;
if (b != 0) a = 0;
if (b != 0) a = 0;





Fig. 5. Path-based watermarking
semantics is preserved. Clearly, for every program P and for every signature s it holds
that αoutO (LP MD) = α
out
O (LPs)MD). In fact the embedding algorithm guarantees that the
insertion and modification of the conditional statements do not affect the variables of the
cover program. Thus, for every input, the cover program and the stegoprogram return the
same output to the user. Other features of this technique are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3.
4.1.3. Abstract watermarking. There is only one known abstract watermarking tech-
nique, namely abstract constant propagation watermarking (Cousot and Cousot 2004).
The signature is a natural number and it is inserted in a particular variable that, al-
though being modified during program execution, remains constant modulo an integer
n. The signature is inserted ensuring no modifications to the semantics of the original
program. This method allows us to insert a signature that is arbitrarily large, since its
embedding in the cover program relies on the decomposition of the signature into k parts
using the Chinese remainder theorem. In this case the inserted mark is given by the
composition of k partial marks that encode numbers smaller than the limit imposed by
the considered programming language. Without loss of generality, in the following, in
order to keep the presentation simple, we assume that such limit does not exist and the
signature is inserted without decomposition.
The embedder modifies the original program in the following way. First, a new variable
w that hides the signature value s is declared. Next, two integer-valued polynomials init
and iter are chosen for the initialization and the modification of the value of w. The
instruction w := init(1) (initialization) is inserted in a random point of the program that
is always executed. The instruction w := iter(w) (iteration) is inserted in a random point
of the program (after initialization), possibly inside a loop. The polynomials must satisfy
the following conditions§: init(1) ≡n s and iter(w) ≡n s. Therefore, once initialized, w
remains constant modulo n, even if its value changes in Z at each iteration.
§ For the generation of such polynomials one can take advantage of the Horner method (Cousot and
Cousot 2004).
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For the formalization of this technique in the framework, we have to extend the infor-
mation contained in the states of execution traces. So, assuming to have an enumeration
of the programs in Imp, we insert in the state the identifier of the program which contains
it. We denote with σi the identifier contained in the states of trace σ. Now we can define
the relation ≈⊆ Σ+ × Σ+ such that for all σ, σ we have that σ ≈ σ iff σi = σi. It is
straightforward to note that ≈ is an equivalence relation. So, given a set of traces X we
denote with X/≈ its quotient set, i.e. the set of its equivalence class induced by ≈. Let
Zn be the (quotient) ring of integers modulo n and Zn
/
= {⊥,Zn} ∪ Zn. We assume to
have a function IsConstn ∈ ℘(Σ+)× Lab −→ (Var −→ Zn) such that: given a set of traces
X and a label l, IsConstn(X, l)(y) returns the value of y modulo n if the variable is
constant in Zn into the set of traces X at label l. If the variable is undefined it returns
⊥ and Zn if the variable is not constant modulo n (this function implements a constant








∣∣∣ ∃l ∈ Lab . IsConstn(X, l)(y) ∈ Zn}
In short, this function returns all the values in Zn of the variables that are constant
modulo n into a given set of traces (at some label). The semantics LP Mβ+ performs constant










∣∣∣∣ ∀σ ∈ Y . σi = id∧constn(Y ) = N
}  ∪ {∅,Σ+}
The domain β contains all the sets of traces with the same values of the variables constant




id∈N{X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | ∀σ ∈ X .σi = id ∧ constn(X) = {s mod n}}
we indicate the set of traces that have a constant variable encoding of the signature s.
Clearly, LM(s)Mβ+ = Ws and so M(s) = {∅,Ws,Σ+}. The domain β can be defined as
β
/





∅ if X = ∅










∣∣∣∣∣ ∀σ ∈ X .σi = id∧constn(X) = N
}
if N /∈ {∅,Zn}
Σ+ otherwise
Instead M(s) can be defined as M(s)
/






∅ if X = ∅
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It is simple to see that for all signatures s we have M(s)(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ β(℘(Σ+)) and so
β v M(s). The input domain is id so there is no an enabling input, or equivalently, all
the inputs reveal the watermark. For every possible set of initial states, the constant
propagation modulo n of L(P,M(s)) is the same, i.e. it exists N ( Zn not empty such
that constn(LL(P,M(s))M+) = N . Due to the definition of this watermarking technique,
N is the set [s]≡n , namely it contains all the values that are equivalent modulo n to s.
So we have that LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) =Ws for every possible set of initial states. Now, the
constant propagation modulo n of M(s) is exactly [s]≡n , so LM(s)M
β
+(X) =Ws for every
possible set of initial states. Hence, for every set of initial states X, we have that both
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) and LM(s)M
β
+(X) are equal to Ws, which represents the signature s.
So we can note that, as expected, for every signature s, LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ is F-complete for
η and M(s).
Let us briefly discuss the features of this technique.
Resilience. The system is not resilient, since it is not immune to distortive attacks that
preserve the denotational semantics, i.e. DenSem 6v
d
{M(s) | s ∈ S}. In fact, suppose
that DenSem v
d
M, so ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) it holds that DenSem(X) ⊆
d
M(X). Let X =Ws,
for a generic signature s, so
d
M(X) = Ws. But Ws ( DenSem(Ws), because there is
at least a trace with the same initial and final state of a trace in Ws which belongs to
a program that does not have a constant variable modulo n equal to s. So there is a
X such that DenSem(X) 6⊆
d
M(X) and hence DenSem 6v
d
M. Indeed the system is
vulnerable to data obfuscation techniques: if we alter the representation of variables then
the stegomark is lost.
Secrecy. The most powerful >-secret attacker for abstract constant propagation wa-
termarking is KL,id,(>)(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈ P, X =
⋃
Q∈QLL(P,Q)M+} ∪ {Σ+}. It
abstracts in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms related to the same
cover program.
Accuracy. Finally, the system is αoutO accurate, where α
out
O is an abstraction that ob-
serves only the output values showed to the user, since this property of the denotational
semantics is preserved. In fact, the embedding algorithm guarantees that the added code
do not affect the variables of the cover program. So, with the same input, the cover pro-
gram and the stegoprogram give the same output. Other features of this technique are
presented in Tables 1, 2, 3.
4.2. Comparison: resilience
Until now we have formalized and validated the framework. The next step is clearly to
show how to use the work done so far for comparing different software watermarking
systems, in order to be able to chose a technique rather than another according to
the needs. In Section 3 we have discussed how different watermarking systems A1 =
〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉 could be compared w.r.t. resilience by comparing
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the degree of abstraction of
d
{M1(s) | s ∈ S} and
d
{M2(s) | s ∈ S}. Of course it may
happen that these two abstractions are not comparable. In this case what we can do is
to compare their resilience w.r.t. a specific distortive attack.
Distortive attacks are semantics-preserving program transformations that try to com-
promise the extraction of the watermark. There are program transformations specifically
designed for this purpose like code obfuscation techniques, and others that may corrupt
the watermark as a side effect, like code optimization. Given the semantics-based formal-
ization of software watermarking and its features, we model distortive attacks as semantic
program transformations as done in (Dalla Preda and Giacobazzi 2005), considering that
their syntactic counterpart can always be derived (Cousot and Cousot 2002). Indeed, any
syntactic program transformer t, altering the code of P and returning a new program P ′,
induces a corresponding semantic transformer t turning LP M+ into LP ′M+. In the following
we consider some well known obfuscations and optimization techniques that can be used
as distortive attacks.
4.2.1. Edge-flipping. The edge-flipping obfuscation exchanges the code executed in the
true branch with the code executed in the false branch of every conditional statement.
In order to preserve the program semantics every branch condition is replaced with its
negation.
We semantically model the edge-flipping attacker tef ∈ Imp −→ Imp as the semantic
transformation tef(X)
/






C = L : stop; ∨
C = L : A→ L′;
〈L : ¬B → {LF , LT }; , ζ〉tef(σ) if C = L : B → {LT , LF };









(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒
⋃
{Z ⊆ Σ+ | Z = tef(Y )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of traces X is preserved by the edge-flipping transformation if
it contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces in X by inverting every
conditional branch and negating the related guard.
4.2.2. Dead code elimination. This is an optimization technique and it consists in the
elimination of those parts of the program which are never executed or which do not affect
the semantics of the program. Let I ∈ Imp −→ ℘(Lab) be the result of a preliminary static
analysis that returns the subset of program labels corresponding to dead code commands.
Usually, the preliminary static analysis consists of dead/faint variable analysis. Given a
program P , we assume to know the set IP ⊆ labJP K of labels that the preliminary static
analysis has classified as dead code. We assume that conditional commands cannot be
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classified as dead code. We denote with slab(ς) the label of the command contained in
the state ς, i.e. if ς = 〈C, ζ〉 then slab(ς) = labJCK.
We semantically model the dead code elimination attacker tdce ∈ Imp −→ Imp as the
semantic transformation tdce ∈ ℘(Σ+)× ℘(Lab) −→ ℘(Σ+) with:
tdce(X, IP )
/
= {tdce(σ, IP ) | σ ∈ X}
tdce(σ, IP )
/
= Elimination(σ, IP )
See Appendix B for the algorithm Elimination, Algorithm 1 - Page 47. The most







where PresP,tdce(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒
⋃{
Z ⊆ Σ+
∣∣∣ Z = tdce(Y, IP )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of traces X is preserved by the dead code elimination transfor-
mation if it contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces in X by eliminating
every command indicated by IP .
4.2.3. Loop-unrolling. This is an optimization technique but it is often used in distortive
attacks. It consists in the unfolding of the loop a certain number of times, i.e. the body of
the loop is replicated for a given factor, the so called unrolling factor. Next, the number of
iterations is divided by the loop unrolling factor. The easiest looping constructs to unroll
are for-loops. Whenever a program P includes a for-loop F , we write F ∈ fors(P ). More
formally, F ∈ fors(P ) iff F
/
= {G, I} ∪ H and F ⊆ P . The command G
/
= lG : X <
E → {lH , lO};, with lG 6= lH and lG 6= lO, implements a branching named guard. As F
always starts with the evaluation of its guard, we have that lG is the entrypoint of F ,
labJF K ∩ labJP \ F K = ∅ and sucJP \ F K ∩ labJF K ⊆ {lG}. The guard is satisfied as long
as X ∈ Var is less than E ∈ Exp (for short, we ignore similar kinds of for-loops which
use >, ≤ or ≥ as comparison operator). If the guard is not satisfied, the for-loop ends
transferring the control flow at entrypoint lO /∈ labJF K. Otherwise, the execution goes
on through H, a set of commands named body, and eventually through an increment
command I
/
= lI : X := X + E′ → lG;, with lI 6= lG and lI = lH ∨ lI ∈ sucJHK (notice
that I makes the control flow return to the guard again). We formally define H as the
collection of all the commands of P that are reachable from G without going through I,
i.e. H
/
= lfp⊆flow(P ), where flow(P )(Q)
/
= {C ∈ P \ {I} | labJCK = sucJGK ∨ ∃C ′ ∈
Q .
labJCK = sucJC ′K}. We require lG, lI /∈ labJHK. We expect both X and the variables
in E and E′ not to be assigned inside H. We require X not to be used in E or E′.
The finite partial trace 〈G, ζ〉η〈I, ζ ′〉 ∈ LF M⊕ is an iteration of the for-loop F , where η ∈
LHM⊕ (if H = ∅ then η = ε). A maximal trace σ ∈ LF M⊕ is a sequence of “terminating”
iterations followed by a state with the command at label lO. Along the trace, the values
of E and E′ do not change, while the value of X, which is constant throughout each
iteration, increases by E′ from one iteration to another. Thus, if ζ is a context in a
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state of σ ∈ LF M⊕, we can predict how many increments X still has to undergo, i.e. the
number of the iterations from ζ till the end of σ (actually we only need the environment
ρ contained in ζ). We just need to define αF :












We let τ be the total number of iterations of σ. Along σ ∈ LF M⊕, the iterations are
naturally unfolded, i.e. they come sequentially one after another. In the original program
F they fold because any command C ∈ F , although occurring in many different iterations,
always appears with the same entrypoint
labJCK.
Loop-unrolling changes the labels in the following way: given the so-called unrolling
factor u ∈ N, it makes all and only the occurrences of C at iterations k mod u have
the same label (with 0 ≤ k < τ), thus partitioning the iterations of σ into u classes.
Only iterations from the same class fold together. So the code of the unrolled loop is u
times longer than F and each of its iterations sequentially executes the task of u native
iterations. In this work we consider only the case in which the total number of iterations
is known (it is constant) and so we can set u = τ . This is also the standard optimizing
behavior of most compilers, like gcc. So we assume that fors(P ) contains only the for-
loops which have a constant number of iterations (we need a preliminary analysis of
program P ) and that iters(F ) returns the number of iterations of F ∈ fors(P ). Let
I ∈ Imp −→ ℘(Lab × Lab) be the result of a preliminary static analysis that given a
program returns the for-loops that can be unrolled. It represents the loop by mean of a
pair of labels which identify the guard and the increment of the loop. Given a program
P , we assume to know the set IP ⊆ labJP K× labJP K of pairs of labels that the preliminary
static analysis has classified as representative of loops that can be unrolled.
We semantically model the loop unrolling attacker tlu ∈ Imp −→ Imp as the semantic
transformation tlu ∈ ℘(Σ+)× ℘(Lab× Lab) −→ ℘(Σ+) with:
tlu(X, IP )
/
= {tlu(σ, IP ) | σ ∈ X}
tlu(σ, IP )
/
= Unroll(σ, IP )










(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒
⋃{
Z ⊆ Σ+
∣∣∣ Z = tlu(Y, IP )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of traces X is preserved by the loop-unrolling transformation if it
contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces in X by substituting the loops
at program points indicated by IP with their sequences of iterations.
M. Dalla Preda and M. Pasqua 36
4.2.4. Opaque predicate insertion. It is a well known obfuscation technique that obfus-
cates the control flow of the program by inserting opaque predicates. A predicate is
opaque if it is evaluated to a constant value. Let I ∈ Imp −→ ℘(Lab) be the result of a
preliminary static analysis that returns the set of program labels where it is possible to
insert opaque predicates. Usually, the preliminary static analysis consists of a liveness
analysis. Given a program P , we assume to know the set IP ⊆ labJP K of labels that the
preliminary static analysis has classified as candidates for opaque predicate insertion. Let
Pt be a true opaque predicate, i.e. a boolean expression that is always evaluated to tt,
let L̂ be a label not in P , i.e. L̂ /∈ labJP K, and let L̃ be a random label of P . Again, we
denote with slab(ς) the label of the command contained in the state ς, i.e. if ς = 〈C, ζ〉
then slab(ς) =
labJCK.
We semantically model the opaque predicate insertion attacker topi ∈ Imp −→ Imp
as the semantic transformation topi ∈ ℘(Σ+) × ℘(Lab) −→ ℘(Σ+) with topi(X, IP )
/
=
{topi(σ, IP ) | σ ∈ X}, where topi(〈C, ζ〉σ, IP )
/
=
〈C, ζ〉topi(σ, IP ) if slab(〈C, ζ〉) /∈ IP
〈L : Pt → {L̂, L̃}; , ζ〉〈L̂ : A→ L′; , ζ〉topi(σ, IP ) if
slab(〈C, ζ〉) ∈ IP∧
C = L : A→ L′;
〈L : Pt → {L̂, L̃}; , ζ〉〈L̂ : B → {LT , LF }; , ζ〉topi(σ, IP ) if
slab(〈C, ζ〉) ∈ IP∧
C = L : B → {LT , LF };
〈L : Pt → {L̂, L̃}; , ζ〉〈L̂ : stop; , ζ〉topi(σ, IP ) if
slab(〈C, ζ〉) ∈ IP∧
C = L : stop;









(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒
⋃{
Z ⊆ Σ+
∣∣∣ Z = topi(Y, IP )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of traces X is preserved by the opaque predicate insertion trans-
formation if it contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces in X by inserting
the opaque predicate Pt at program points indicated by IP .
4.2.5. Loop-invariant code motion. This is an optimization technique and it consists
in moving outside the loops the code which is loop-invariant, i.e. those instructions
that can be moved outside the body of a loop without affecting the semantics of the
program. In this context, we assume that only assignments can be moved outside loops.
Let I : Imp −→ ℘(Lab) be the result of a preliminary static analysis that returns the set
of program labels of those commands that can be moved without affecting the behavior
of the program. Usually, the preliminary static analysis consists of a reaching definitions
analysis. Given a program P , we assume to know the set IP ⊆ labJP K of labels that the
preliminary static analysis has classified as loop-invariant. For every l ∈ IP it is trivial
Semantics-based Software Watermarking by Abstract Interpretation 37
to retrieve the for-loop F ∈ fors(P ) (function defined formally at Page 34) that contains
the command at label l. This can be done observing a program trace. So we assume to
have a function entry that retrieves the label of the loop’s guard related to the loop
which contains the command with label l, namely lG = entry(l) iff F = {G, I} ∪ H,
l ∈ labJH ∪ IK and lG = labJGK. We assume also to have a function exit that retrieves
the label of the command just next to the loop which contains the command with label
l, namely lO = exit(l) iff F = {G, I} ∪H, l ∈ labJH ∪ IK and G = lG : B → {lH , lO};.
Let L̂ be a label not in P , i.e. L̂ /∈ labJP K. Again we denote with slab(ς) the label of the
command contained in the state ς, i.e. if ς = 〈C, ζ〉 then slab(ς) = labJCK.
We semantically model the loop-invariant code motion attacker tlicm ∈ Imp −→ Imp as
the semantic transformation tlicm ∈ ℘(Σ+)× ℘(Lab) −→ ℘(Σ+) with:
tlicm(X, IP )
/
= {tlicm(σ, IP ) | σ ∈ X}
tlicm(σ, IP )
/
= Motion(σ, IP )










(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒
⋃{
Z ⊆ Σ+
∣∣∣ Z = tlicm(Y, IP )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of traces X is preserved by the loop-invariant code motion trans-
formation if it contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces in X by moving
each command, at program points indicated by IP , just before (outside) the loop that
contains it.
4.2.6. Data-obfuscation. This is a class of obfuscation techniques that obscure the data
structures used by programs. These transformations convert the representation of vari-
ables to a representation that is harder to analyze: variables are encoded in an unnatural
way (Collberg et al. 1997), either changing variables types or modifying their values.
Hence, these transformations affect how data is stored and the methods used to interpret
stored data. So there is an data-encoding function Enc ∈ T −→ T ′ that gives the new
representation of a variable, and a data-decoding function Dec ∈ T ′ −→ T that gives back
the original representation. Of course, operations on variables need to be changed too.
Hence, for every operation op ∈ T ×T −→ T we need a new operation op′ ∈ T ′×T ′ −→ T ′.
For example, a simple data-encoding for integers variables is the one that increments
values by one. In our language, the data-encoding of a value is Enc(n) = n + 1 and the
data-decoding is Dec(n) = n− 1. The new arithmetic operations are:
E1 +
′ E2 = Enc(E1) + Enc(E2)− 1 E1 −′ E2 = Enc(E1)− Enc(E2)
E1 ·′ E2 = Enc(E1) · Enc(E2)− Enc(E1)− Enc(E2) + 2 with Enc(X) = X
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The actions which need modifications are only assignments and inputs. For the first, we
need to replace X :=E with X := Enc(E), for the second we need to add after an input
inputX an assignment X :=X+1. We semantically model the data-obfuscation attacker
tdo ∈ Imp −→ Imp as the semantic transformation tdo ∈ ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) with:
tdo(X)
/









{X ⊆ Σ+ | PresP,tdo(X)}
where PresP,tdo(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒
⋃
{Z ⊆ Σ+ | Z = tdo(Y )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of traces X is preserved by the data-obfuscation transformation if
it contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces in X by data-encoding/data-
decoding all variables with the functions Enc and Dec.
4.2.7. Comparison results. The formalization of both the watermarking techniques and
the distortive attacks in the semantic setting has allowed us to formally prove the re-
silience of the considered watermarking systems, w.r.t. the distortive attacks described
above.
Proposition 4.1. Static graph-based watermarking is topi-ineffective. This means that
∀s ∈ S . δtopi 6vM(s).
Proof. We prove this by showing that its negation leads to an absurd. So, suppose that
∃s ∈ S . δtopi v M(s). Indeed, for every set of traces X we have δtopi(X) ⊆ M(s)(X).
Take X = Ws. In this case M(s)(X) = Ws and, due to extensivity, Ws ⊆ δtopi(Ws).
So Ws = δtopi(Ws) must necessarily hold. Note that δtopi(Ws) ∈ δtopi(℘(Σ+)) and that
Pres
P,topi
(Ws) does not hold. This latter implies Ws /∈ δtopi(℘(Σ+)). But this is absurd
because Ws = δtopi(Ws) ∈ δtopi(℘(Σ+)).
Proposition 4.2. Static graph-based watermarking is tef-resilient. This means that
δtef v
d
{M(s) | s ∈ S}.
Proof. We prove that the negation of this proposition leads to an absurd. So, suppose
that δtef 6v
d
{M(s) | s ∈ S} =
d
M, which is equivalent to say that for every set of traces
X we have
d





X = Ws, for some signature s. In this case
d
M(X) = Ws and so Ws ( δtef(Ws). Note
that Pres
P,tef
(Ws) holds henceWs ∈ δtef(℘(Σ+)). Indeed we have thatWs ( δtef(Ws) =
Ws, which is absurd.
It is possible to reason about the resilience of the other watermarking techniques in a
similar manner. Table 1 summarizes our results by showing which watermarking system
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is resilient (X), w.r.t. an attacker, and which one is ineffective (×). We can observe that
path-base watermarking is not resilient w.r.t. edge-flipping but it is resilient w.r.t. dead-
code elimination. Abstract watermarking is resilient w.r.t. control-flow obfuscations and
code-optimization techniques but it is not resilient w.r.t. data obfuscations, even the
simplest. Indeed, the attacker tdo maintains the signature variable w constant modulo
n, but it changes its value: after the attack the signature is s + 1 instead of s. More
sophisticated data obfuscations can be applied. For instance it is possible to encode
variables in a way that they are congruent modulo an arbitrary value, so letting the
stegoextractor unable to retrieve any signature. Interestingly, the dynamic graph-based
watermarking is resilient w.r.t. every attack, this means that it embeds the signature in
an abstract property that is preserved by all the considered attackers. Thus, if we want
to develop a watermarking system resilient to common obfuscation techniques we should
encode the signature in an abstract property implied by the denotational semantics.
We can also note that some optimization techniques, like dead-code elimination and
loop-invariant code motion, do not interfere with all the watermarking schemes analyzed,
so they can be applied safely. Instead, loop unrolling must be applied with more attention.
Indeed we cannot use this optimization technique with block-reordering or path-based
watermarking because it damages the stegomark.
tef tdce tlu topi tlicm tdo
Block-reordering X X × × X X
Static graph-based X X × × X X
Dynamic graph-based X X X X X X
Path-based × X × × X X
Abstract constant propagation X X X X X ×
Table 1. Resilience
4.3. Comparison: secrecy and transparence
In Section 3 we have discussed how different watermarking systems could be compared
w.r.t. secrecy and transparence based on the comparison of their most powerful secret
and transparent attackers, respectively. Also in this case, it may happen that the two
abstractions are not comparable. In this case we compare secrecy and transparence w.r.t.
particular observations.
4.3.1. Observations. Let us denote with Ocfg the abstract interpreter that computes the
control flow graph of programs, with Oacp the abstract interpreter that performs the
analysis of constant propagation modulo n (n ∈ N), with Ohg the abstract interpreter
that extracts the graph allocated in the heap, and with Occs the abstract interpreter
that retrieves the choices made at conditional statements. Note that this abstract in-
terpreters implement the stegoextractors of the watermarking techniques described in
Section 4.1: Ocfg for block-reordering watermarking, Oacp for abstract constant propaga-
tion watermarking, Ohg for dynamic graph-based watermarking and Occs for path-based
watermarking.
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Ocfg Oacp Ohg Occs
Block-reordering – – φ > φ > – –
Static graph-based – – φ > φ > φ >
Dynamic graph-based φ > φ > – – φ >
Path-based – – φ > φ > – –
Abstract constant propagation φ > – – φ > φ >
Table 2. Secrecy
Ocfg Oacp Ohg Occs
Block-reordering × X X ×
Static graph-based × X X ×
Dynamic graph-based X X × X
Path-based × X X ×
Abstract constant propagation X × X X
Table 3. Transparence
4.3.2. Comparison results. Given the semantic formalization of the considered water-
marking systems and of the four observers introduced above, we provide a formal proof
of the secrecy and transparence of these watermarking systems w.r.t. Ocfg, Oacp, Ohg
and Occs.
Proposition 4.3. Static graph-based watermarking is not >-secret w.r.t Ocfg.
Proof. Let ρ = Ocfg, i.e. the semantic counterpart of Ocfg. ∀P ∈ P ∀s, s′ ∈ S we have
that LL(P,M(s))Mρ+ 6= LL(P,M(s′))M
ρ
+. In fact, ρ is more concrete than the extraction
domain and this makes it able to see differences between any stegoprogram. In fact the
extraction domain β distinguish programs looking at the marked subgraph of CFGs while
ρ can distinguish CFGs in a more precise way.
Proposition 4.4. Block-reordering watermarking is transparent w.r.t. Oacp.
Proof. Let ρ = Oacp, i.e. the semantic counterpart of Oacp. ∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S we have
that LP Mρ+ = LL(P,M(s))M
ρ
+. In fact, the reordering of the basic block of P does not alter
the values of the program’s variables. So the constant propagation modulo n computed
on P and every possible stegoprogram returns the same results.
It is possible to reason about secrecy and the transparence of the other watermarking
techniques in a similar manner. Table 2 and Table 3 summarize our results. For example,
block-reordering watermarking is not >-secret and it is not φ-secret, for any possible φ,
w.r.t. Ocfg. Instead, it is >-secret, and so φ-secret for all possible φ, w.r.t. an observer
which looks at constants (Oacp). Moreover, abstract constant propagation watermark-
ing is invisible w.r.t. Ocfg while it is not invisible w.r.t. Oacp. So, as we can see, all
these techniques are not invisible only w.r.t. the observers which are more precise thand
{M(s) | s ∈ S}.
Finally, the dynamic graph-based watermarking is secret and transparent w.r.t. all
attackers, except Ohg. Note that this latter retrieves the same information of the dy-
namic graph-based watermarking stegoextractor, hence the technique cannot be se-
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cret/transparent w.r.t. this observer. The same holds for abstract constant propagation
watermarking. Hence, even if we cannot compare directly the watermarking schemes, we
can say that the dynamic graph-based watermarking and abstract constant propagation
watermarking are the more safe techniques to use, w.r.t. the given set of attackers.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a semantics-based definition of software watermarking
and its qualifying features. This definition is general enough to allow the specification of
static, abstract and dynamic watermarking techniques. Indeed, all these techniques can
be seen as the exploitation of a completeness hole for the insertion of the signature in
an efficient way. Only attackers that are complete w.r.t. the semantic encoding of the
signature are able to observe the signature and potentially tamper with it. This means
that the abstract domain used for the semantic encoding of the signature M(s) acts like a
secret key that allows to disclose the signature only to those attackers that are complete
w.r.t. M(s).
Regarding the features of a watermarking scheme, our general framework provides
a formal setting for proving the efficiency of a watermarking scheme w.r.t. resilience,
secrecy, transparence and accuracy. To validate our theory we have proved the efficiency
of five known watermarking systems. Thus, we provide a general theory where researchers
can build a formal evidence of the quality of the watermarking system that they propose.
We believe that this is an important contribution that can be considered as the first step
towards a formal theory for software watermarking, where new and existing techniques
can be certified w.r.t. their efficiency.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1
First, we have to prove that 〈℘(Σ+),6〉 is a partially ordered set.
Reflexivity. For all X ∈ ℘(Σ+), X 6 X holds, in fact ∀σ ∈ X ∃σ′ ∈ X .σ ∈ pref(σ′)
holds for σ′ = σ and hence X ⊆ X is trivially true.
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Antisymmetry. For all X,Y ∈ ℘(Σ+):
b) from X 6 Y it follows that ∀σ ∈ X ∃σ′ ∈ Y . σ ∈ pref(σ′) and so from Y 6 X
(the second part of the conjunction) it follows that X ⊆ Y
a) from Y 6 X it follows that ∀σ′ ∈ Y ∃σ ∈ X .σ′ ∈ pref(σ) and so from X 6 Y
(the second part of the conjunction) it follows that Y ⊆ X
From a and b it follows that X = Y .
Transitivity. For all X,Y, Z ∈ ℘(Σ+):
c) from X 6 Y it follows that ∀σx ∈ X ∃σy ∈ Y . σx ∈ pref(σy)
d) from Y 6 Z it follows that ∀σy′ ∈ Y ∃σz ∈ Z . σy′ ∈ pref(σz)
Considering c and d it is easy to find for all σx ∈ X a σz ∈ Z such that σx ∈ pref(σz),
in fact with σy = σy
′
the relation is satisfied. In the end from Z ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X it
follows that Z ⊆ X. So X 6 Z holds.
So 6 is a partial order on ℘(Σ+).




X is an upper bound
of X , but we have to prove that it is the least. In order to prove that ∀X ⊆ ℘(Σ+)∀$ ∈
℘(Σ+) . (∀X ∈ X . X 6 $) ⇒
⊎
X 6 $ we show that its negate is false, i.e. we prove





∀X ∈ X . X 6 $ means that ∀σ ∈
⋃
X∈X X ∃σ′ ∈ $ .σ ∈ pref(σ′) and $ 6
⊎
X
means that ∀σ′ ∈ $ ∃σ′′ ∈
⊎





∀σ′ ∈ $ ∃σ′′ ∈
⋃
X∈X X .σ
′ ∈ pref(σ′′). From the last proposition and from ∀σ ∈⋃
X∈X X ∃σ′ ∈ $ .σ ∈ pref(σ′) it follows that $ =
⋃
X∈X X (and so
⊎
X ⊆ $). By the
fact that
⊎
X 6= $ we have that ∃σ′′ ∈
⊎




Third, the bottom element is ∅ ∈ ℘(Σ+), i.e. ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) .∅ 6 X holds. In fact,
with no traces, the conditions of the relation are vacuously true and, if X = ∅, ∅ 6 ∅
trivially holds.
Finally, for all X ⊆ ℘(Σ+) it is easy to note that
⊎
X exists and it is a set of finite
traces, so
⊎
X ∈ ℘(Σ+). So, by the fact that 〈℘(Σ+),6〉 has minimum (bottom), in
addition to the fact that for each subset of ℘(Σ+) there is a least upper bound in ℘(Σ+),
we get that 〈℘(Σ+),6,],∅〉 is a join semi-lattice and hence a directed-complete partial
order (DCPO). 
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Proof of Proposition 2.2






X1 = F+P [I](X
0) = LP M1I ] {σςς ′ | σς ∈ ∅ ∧ ς ′ ∈
SJP K(ς)} = I = LP M1I
X2 = F+P [I](X
1) = LP M1I ] {σςς ′ | σς ∈ X1 ∧ ς ′ ∈
SJP K(ς)} =
= LP M1I ] (LP M1̄I ] LP M2I) = LP M1̄I ] LP M2I
X3 = F+P [I](X
2) = LP M1I ] {σςς ′ | σς ∈ X2 ∧ ς ′ ∈
SJP K(ς)} =
= LP M1I ] (LP M1̄I ] LP M2̄I ] LP M3I) = LP M1̄I ] LP M2̄I ] LP M3I




LP MīI ] LP MnI
In fact
F+P [I](X
n) = LP M1I ] {σςς ′ | σς ∈ Xn ∧ ς ′ ∈
SJP K(ς)} =
= LP M1I ] (
n⊎
i=1




LP MīI ] LP Mn+1I = X
n+1
Due to the fact that F+P [I] is Scott-continuous and that it is defined over a DCPO, F
+
P [I]
admits a fixpoint, i.e. exists k ∈ N such that F+P [I](X
k) = Xk, and it is exactly the least






LP MīI ] LP Mk+1I =
k−1⊎
i=1
LP MīI ] LP MkI = Xk
and so that
LP Mk̄I ∪ LP Mk+1I = LP M
k
I
LP Mk̄I ∪ LP Mk+1I = LP M
k̄
I ∪ {σ ∈ LP MkI | σa /∈ TP }
LP Mk+1I = {σ ∈ LP M
k
I | σa /∈ TP }
The only way to make the last equation true is to have LP Mk+1I = ∅ and {σ ∈ LP MkI | σa /∈
TP } = ∅, due to the fact that {σ ∈ LP MkI | σa /∈ TP } and LP M
k+1
I do not share any
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Proof of Theorem 2.1
First, it is necessary to prove that this set is an upper closure operator and, after
that, we have to prove that is the most concrete closure for which the program is
safe. Upper closure operators are isomorphic to Moore families so we prove that {X ∈
℘(Σ+) | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)} is a Moore family. For doing so we have only to prove that this set
contains the intersection of all its elements. ConsiderX,Y ∈ {Z ∈ ℘(Σ+) | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(Z)}.
For hypothesis we have that:
∀P ∈P ∀Q ∈ Q .
(∃Z ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) . Z ⊆ X ⇒ ∀W ∈ Υ
H+
I,η,(φ)(P,Q) .W ⊆ X)∧
(∃Z ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) . Z ⊆ Y ⇒ ∀W ∈ Υ
H+
I,η,(φ)(P,Q) .W ⊆ Y )
So we have to prove that the same condition holds for X ∩Y . Suppose that ∀P ∈ P ∀Q ∈
Q it exists Z in ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) such that Z ⊆ X ∩ Y (indeed Z ⊆ X and Z ⊆ Y ).
For hypothesis SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X) and Secr
H+
I,η,(φ)(Y ) hold, so ∀W ∈ Υ
H+
I,η,(φ)(P,Q) we have
that W is contained in X and W is contained in Y , namely W ⊆ X ∩ Y . Therefore
SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X ∩ Y ) holds. This result can be easily extended to a generic intersection, so
{X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)} is a Moore family.
Second, we have to prove non-interference, i.e. for ρ̂
/
= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)}
it is true
H









+, with LI(P1, Q1)M
ρ̂
+ 6= LI(P2, Q2)M
ρ̂
+. We can note that
LI(P1, Q1)M+ and LI(P2, Q2)M+ are in Υ
H+
I,η,(φ)(P1, Q1), in fact P1 ≡η P2 and Q1 ≡φ Q2.









sis we have that X1 6= X2 but, due to the fact that X1, X2 ∈ ρ̂, we have SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X1)
and SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X2). Now, if X2 6⊆ X1, we have LI(P1, Q1)M+ ∈ Υ
H+
I,η,(φ)(P1, Q1) such that
LI(P1, Q1)M+ ⊆ X1, whilst LI(P2, Q2)M+ ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P1, Q1) such that LI(P1, Q1)M+ 6⊆ X1:
absurd (for the hypothesis on X1). Similarly, reasoning on X2 ⊆ X1 we obtain the same








+ implies that LI(P1, Q1)M
ρ̂
+
is equal to LI(P2, Q2)M
ρ̂
+.
Finally we have to prove that the closure is the most concrete. Suppose the contrary,
i.e. it exists a domain ρ such that ρ̂ 6v ρ and H+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca holds. Remember that
ρ̂ v ρ iff ρ ⊆ ρ̂. Take into account the case in which ρ̂ ( ρ. At this point we can note
that it exists X ∈ ρ such that X /∈ ρ̂, i.e. for which SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X) does not hold. But
this means that it exists P ∈ P and Q ∈ Q such that ∃Z ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) . Z ⊆ X
and ∃W ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) .W 6⊆ X. So Z = LI(P1, Q1)M+, for some P1 ∈ P, Q1 ∈ Q
and W = LI(P2, Q2)M+, for some P2 ∈ P, Q2 ∈ Q, with P1 ≡η P2 ≡η P and Q2 ≡φ
Q2 ≡φ Q due to the fact that both the sets belong to ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q). All this implies
that LI(P1, Q1)M
ρ
+ ⊆ X due to LI(P1, Q1)M+ ∈ X, whilst LI(P2, Q2)M
ρ
+ 6⊆ X due to
LI(P2, Q2)M+ /∈ X. Indeed LI(P1, Q1)M
ρ
+ 6= LI(P2, Q2)M
ρ
+, but this is impossible, in fact we
supposed that
H
+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca. So a domain like ρ doesn’t exist. 




1: for all l ∈ I do
2: Let σi such that slab(σi) = l
3: l′ ← slab(σi+1)
4: j ← 0
5: while j < |σ| do // |σ| is updated at every cycle
6: Let σj = 〈Cj , ζj〉
7: if slab(σj) = l then
8: Let σj+1 = 〈Cj+1, ζj+1〉
9: σj+1 ← 〈Cj+1, ζj〉
10: σj ← ∅
11: j ← j − 1
12: else
13: if Cj = L : A→ l; then
14: σj ← 〈L : A→ l′; , ζj〉
15: if Cj = L : B → {l, LF }; then
16: σj ← 〈L : B → {l′, LF }; , ζj〉
17: if Cj = L : B → {LT , l}; then
18: σj ← 〈L : B → {LT , l′}; , ζj〉
19: j ← j + 1
Output σ
M. Dalla Preda and M. Pasqua 48
Algorithm 2 Unroll
Input σ, I
1: for all 〈lG, lI〉 ∈ I do
2: Let σi = 〈Ci, ζi〉 such that slab(σi) = lG
3: Let σj = 〈Cj , ζj〉 such that slab(σj) = lI
4: Let X the variable of the guard in Ci, i.e. Ci = l
G : X < E → {lH , lO};
5: Let X the variable in the increment Cj , i.e. Cj = l
I : X := X+Ė → lG;
6: Let ė be the value of expression Ė computed in context ζj
7: Itrs← ordered list of pairs 〈i, j〉 with, i < j, such that:
slab(σi) = l
G ∧ slab(σj) = lO ∧ ∀k ∈ (i, j) . slab(σk) 6= lO
8: for all 〈i, j〉 ∈ Itrs do // in list order
9: m← 0
10: for k = i to j − 1 do
11: Let σk = 〈Ck, 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
12: if slab(σk) = l
G then
13: m← m+ 1
14: if m > 1 then
15: L← lGm−1
16: ρk ← ρk[X ←[ ρk(X)−mė]
17: else
18: L← lG
19: σk ← 〈L : skip→ lH
m
; 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
20: if slab(σk) = l
I then
21: σk ← 〈lI
m
: skip→ lGm; , 〈ρk[X ←[ ρk(X)−mė], ιk〉〉
22: if slab(σk) 6= lG ∧ slab(σk) 6= lI then // so Ck ∈ H
23: if Ck = L : B → {LT , LF }; then
24: B′ ← B[X ← [ X + (m− 1)ė]
25: Ck ← Lm : B′ → {LmT , LmF };
26: if Ck = L1 : A→ L2; then
27: A′ ← A[X ←[ X + (m− 1)ė]
28: Ck ← Lm1 : A′ → Lm2 ;
29: σk ← 〈Ck, 〈ρk[X ←[ ρk(X)−mė], ιk〉〉
30: Let σj−1 = 〈Cj−1, ζj−1〉
31: σ′ ← σ0 . . . σi . . . σj−1
32: σ′ ← σ′〈lHm : X := X + (m− 1)ė→ lO; , ζj−1〉
33: σ ← σ′σj . . . σ|σ|−1
Output σ
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Algorithm 3 Motion
Input σ, I
1: for all l ∈ I do
2: Let σk = 〈Cl, ζk〉 such that slab(σk) = l
3: Let X be the variable assigned in Cl, i.e. Cl = l : X := El → l′;
4: Let e be the value of expression El computed in context ζj
5: lG ← entry(l)
6: lO ← exit(l)
7: Itrs← ordered list of pairs 〈i, j〉, with i < j, such that:
slab(σi) = l
G ∧ slab(σj) = lO ∧ ∀k ∈ (i, j) . slab(σk) 6= lO
8: Let 〈i, j〉 the first element of Itrs
9: w ← 0
10: for all 〈i, j〉 ∈ Itrs do // in list order
11: σ′ ← σw . . . σi−2
12: Let σi−1 = 〈Ci−1, ζi−1〉
13: if Ci−1 = L : A→ lG; then
14: σ′ ← σ′〈L : A→ L̂; ζi−1〉〈L̂ : X := El → lG, ζi−1〉
15: if Ci−1 = L : B → {lG, LF }; then
16: σ′ ← σ′〈L : B → {L̂, LF }; ζi−1〉〈L̂ : X := El → lG, ζi−1〉
17: if Ci−1 = L : B → {LT , lG}; then
18: σ′ ← σ′〈L : B → {LT , L̂}; ζi−1〉〈L̂ : X := El → lG, ζi−1〉
19: for all k ∈ [i, j) do
20: Let σk = 〈Ck, 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
21: σk ← 〈Ck, 〈ρk[X ← [ e], ιk〉〉
22: if slab(σk) 6= l then
23: if Ck = L : A→ l then
24: σk ← 〈L : A→ l′; , 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
25: if Ck = L : B → {l, LF }; then
26: σk ← 〈L : B → {l′, LF }; , 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
27: if Ck = L : B → {LT , l}; then
28: σk ← 〈L : B → {LT , l′}; , 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
29: σ′ ← σ′σk
30: w ← j
31: Let 〈i, j〉 the last element of Itrs
32: σ′ ← σ′σj . . . σ|σ|−1
33: σ ← σ′
34: i← 0
35: for j = 0 to |σ| − 1 do
36: if slab(σj) /∈ I then
37: σ′i ← σj
38: i← i+ 1
Output σ′
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Algorithm 4 Enc-Dec
Input σ
1: Itrs← list of variables of σ
2: Labs← set of labels of σ
3: Let σ0 = 〈C0, ζ0〉
4: σ′ ← 〈L : Itrs0 := Itrs0 + 1→ L′; , ζ0〉 such that L,L′ /∈ Labs
5: k ← 1
6: while k < |Itrs| do
7: Let σ′k−1 = 〈L : A→ L′; , 〈ρ, ι〉〉
8: σ′ ← σ
′〈L′ : Itrsk := Itrsk + 1→ L′′; , 〈ρ[Itrsk−1 ← [ ρ(Itrsk−1) + 1], ι〉〉
such that L′′ /∈ Labs
9: k ← k + 1
10: Let σ′k−1 = 〈L : A→ L′; , 〈ρ, ι〉〉
11: σ′′ ← σ′0 . . . σ′k−2
12: σ′ ← σ′′〈L : A→ labJC0K, 〈ρ, ι〉〉〈C0, 〈ρ[Itrsk−1 ←[ ρ(Itrsk−1) + 1], ι〉〉
13: σ′ ← σ′σ1 . . . σ|σ|−1
14: while k < |σ′| do
15: Let σ′k = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉
16: ρ′ ← ρ
17: for all j ∈ [0, |Itrs|) do
18: ρ′ ← ρ′[Itrsj ← [ ρ′(Itrsj) + 1]
19: if C = L : B → {Ltt, Lff}; then
20: σ′ ← σ′0 . . . σ′k−1〈L : Enc(B)→ {Ltt, Lff}; , 〈ρ′, ι〉〉σ′k+1 . . . σ′|σ′|−1
21: else if C = L : X := E → L′; then
22: σ′ ← σ′0 . . . σ′k−1〈L : X := Enc(E)→ L′; , 〈ρ′, ι〉〉σ′k+1 . . . σ′|σ′|−1
23: else if C = L : inputX → L′; then
24: σ′′ ← σ′0 . . . σ′k−1〈L : inputX → L′′; 〈ρ, ι〉〉 such that L′′ /∈ Labs
25: Let σ′k+1 = 〈Ck+1, 〈ρk+1, ιk+1〉〉
26: σ′′ ← σ′′〈L′′ : X := X + 1→ L′; , 〈ρk+1, ιk+1〉〉
27: ρ′′ ← ρ′[X ←[ ρk+1(X) + 1]
28: σ′ ← σ′′〈Ck+1, 〈ρ′′, ιk+1〉〉σ′k+2 . . . σ′|σ′|−1
29: else
30: σ′ ← σ′0 . . . σ′k−1〈C, 〈ρ′, ι〉〉σ′k+1 . . . σ′|σ′|−1
31: k ← k + 1
32: Let σ′k−1 = 〈L : stop, ζ〉
33: σ′ ← σ′0 . . . σ′k−2〈L : Itrs0 := Itrs0 − 1→ L′; , ζ〉 such that L′ /∈ Labs
34: j ← 1
35: while j < |Itrs| do
36: Let σ′k−1 = 〈L : A→ L′; , 〈ρ, ι〉〉
37: σ′ ← σ
′〈L′ : Itrsj := Itrsj − 1→ L′′; 〈ρ[Itrsj−1 ← [ ρ(Itrsj−1)− 1], ι〉〉
such that L′′ /∈ Labs
38: k ← k + 1
39: j ← j + 1
40: Let σ′k−1 = 〈L : A→ L′; , ζ〉
41: σ′ ← σ′〈L′ : stop; ζ〉
Output σ′
Semantics-based Software Watermarking by Abstract Interpretation 51
The syntactic encoding (for arithmetic expressions) Enc ∈ E −→ E is inductively defined
as:
Enc(n) = (n+ 1)
Enc(X) = X
Enc(E1 + E2) = (Enc(E1) + Enc(E2))
Enc(E1 · E2) = (Enc(E1) · Enc(E2))
Enc(E1 − E2) = (Enc(E1)− Enc(E2))
The syntactic encoding (for boolean expressions) Enc ∈ B −→ B is inductively defined as:
Enc(b) = b
Enc(¬B) = ¬Enc(B)
Enc(B1 ∧B2) = Enc(B1) ∧ Enc(B2)
Enc(B1 ∨B2) = Enc(B1) ∨ Enc(B2)
Enc(E1 < E2) = Enc(E1) < Enc(E2)
Enc(E1 = E2) = Enc(E1) = Enc(E2)
